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SMALL BUSINESS, RISING GIANT: 
POLICIES AND COSTS OF SECTION 
8(A) CONTRACTING 
PREFERENCES FOR ALASKA 
NATIVE CORPORATIONS 
JENNY J. YANG 
Under the Small Business Act, Alaska Native corporations 
(ANCs) not only have special contracting status under the Section 
8(a) Business Development Program but also enjoy additional 
advantages over other small businesses.  In recent years this legal 
treatment has come under scrutiny and criticism due to instances 
in which work under contracts awarded to ANCs without 
competitive bidding has been subcontracted out to large 
companies ineligible for 8(a) benefits.  Two congressmen initiated 
an investigation into these no-bid contracts awarded to ANCs 
resulting in a report from the Government Accountability Office 
as well as a Congressional hearing focusing on the issue.  Both 
appear to confirm much of the media’s criticisms.  This Note 
examines the laws granting special contracting advantages to 
ANCs, the costs and benefits of these advantages, as well as some 
possibilities for legislative and other reforms. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Alaska Native corporations (ANCs) were established by the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA) to 
administer land settlements in Alaska.1  Under the Small Business 
Act,2 ANCs not only have special contracting status under the 
Section 8(a) Business Development Program but also enjoy unique 
privileges over and above other 8(a) small businesses.  Most 
importantly, ANCs are exempt from the dollar limitation on 
contracts that can be received outside of the competitive bidding 
 
Copyright © 2006 by Jenny J. Yang. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 1601–1629(h) (2000)). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384 (1958) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 631–657(f) (2000)). 
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process that is applicable to other 8(a) businesses.3  In the past two 
years, this legal treatment has drawn intense, mostly negative 
media attention.  In addition, a congressional investigation was 
spurred by the grant to ANCs, without competition, of large-value 
defense contracts that were then subcontracted to companies 
ineligible for 8(a) benefits.4 
This Note will describe the legal edge that ANCs enjoy in 
receiving valuable government contracts and will discuss instances 
of alleged abuse.  The Note will also show that while significant 
potential exists for this edge to improve the economic status of 
Alaska Natives, the unique access of ANCs to government 
contracts undermines the policy of competitive access, imposes 
high costs on taxpayers, and excludes other small and minority 
businesses’ access to federal procurement dollars, while fostering a 
dependency by ANCs that obstructs true business development 
and independence and renders balanced reform difficult.  Part II 
provides a brief background on the history of the legal 
establishment and economic performance of ANCs; Part III 
explains the legal substance of the contracting advantages for 
ANCs in the 8(a) Program; Part IV examines how these advantages 
are used in practice, focusing on the subcontracting practices which 
have drawn media scrutiny and a congressional investigation; Part 
V describes the results of the investigation; and Part VI analyzes 
the benefits and costs of the ANC preferences, some possible 
remedies to address the problems associated with the costs, and the 
potential difficulty of finding a balanced solution. 
II.  BACKGROUND ON ANCS 
Any discussion of ANCs and their economic status today 
necessitates a brief overview of their legal creation under ANCSA.  
At a time when the legal validity of aboriginal rights and claims to 
lands within the state was unclear, ANCSA was drafted partly in 
response to rising pressures to settle these claims so that 
development and transportation of the state’s oil resources could 
proceed in legal safety.5  ANCSA extinguished all claims based on 
 
 3. 13 C.F.R. § 124.506(b) (2006). 
 4. See, e.g., Michael Scherer, Little Big Companies: How Did Corporations 
Like Halliburton Get Millions in Government Contracts Designated for Small 
Minority Businesses? MOTHER JONES, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 26, available at 
http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/notebook/2005/01/11_400.html. 
 5. See FELIX S. COHEN ET AL., FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW ch. 14 § A (1982); see also Ben Summit, The Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act (ANCSA): Friend or Foe in the Struggle to Recover Alaska Native 
Heritage, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 607, 613–14 (1997). 
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aboriginal rights to land in Alaska by Alaska Natives against the 
federal and state governments,6 and, in turn, it distributed forty 
million acres of the land to Alaska Natives.7 A “Native” was 
defined as a United States citizen who is “one-fourth degree or 
more Alaska Indian . . . Eskimo, or Aleut blood, or combination 
thereof.”8  Broadly speaking, ANCSA mandated that the Secretary 
of the Interior divide lands in Alaska into twelve regions, each 
including Alaska Natives with “a common heritage and sharing 
common interests.”9  Twelve “regional corporations” and over two 
hundred “village corporations” were created to select lands for use 
within the twelve regions, as well as to administer their share of the 
monetary grant.10  A thirteenth regional corporation was created 
for nonresident natives, and it received money but no land.11  The 
village corporations were to first select twenty-two million acres 
from the thirty-eight million granted under the law, and the 
regional corporations were to select the remaining sixteen million 
acres.12  These sixteen million acres were required to be 
redistributed to the villages.13  Under the law, all resident Alaska 
Natives received one hundred shares of stock in one of the twelve 
regional corporations and also became shareholders in the village 
corporations that were organized for their respective villages.14  
ANCSA also distributed $462.5 million of congressional 
appropriations funds and $500 million in oil royalties15 to the 
thirteen regional corporations, which were in turn required to 
 
 6. 43 U.S.C. § 1603 (2000). 
 7. See 43 U.S.C. § 1611 (2000). 
 8. 43 U.S.C. § 1602(b) (2000). 
 9. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(a) (2000); see COHEN ET AL., supra note 5, ch. 14 § A. 
 10. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606–1607 (2000); COHEN ET AL., supra note 5, ch. 14 § A. 
 11. See 43 U.S.C. § 1606(c), 1606(i).  The thirteen regional corporations are: 
AHTNA, Inc., Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, Bering Straights Native 
Corporation, Bristol Bay Native Corporation, Calista Corporation, Chugach 
Alaska Corporation, Cook Inlet Region, Inc., Cook Inlet Tribal Council, Doyon, 
Limited, Koniag, Inc., Sealaska Corporation, Sitnasuak Native Corporation, and 
Thirteenth Regional Corporation.  Alaska Native Corporations, Organizations 
and Informational Resources, http://www.alaskans.com/alaskanative (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2006). 
 12. See 43 U.S.C. § 1611. 
 13. See 43 U.S.C. § 1611(a)–(b). 
 14. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606(g), 1607. 
 15. 43 U.S.C. § 1605 (2000). 
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distribute the funds to the village corporations and to their 
shareholders who had no ownership in any village corporation.16 
The economic performance of ANCs during the two decades 
after their creation was “surprisingly poor” with collective losses of 
$380 million by 1993.17  Far from fulfilling their “impressive task of 
improving the social and economic status of Alaska Natives,”18 
most of the ANCs generally teetered on the edge of insolvency 
until the early 1990s due to the inflation in the 1970s,19 the costs of 
compliance with ANCSA, and the costly litigation over its 
ambiguous provisions.20  As a result, mergers between village 
corporations as well as between regional and village corporations 
became a “tactic for survival.”21  Moreover, it became apparent that 
the regional corporations experienced widely varying degrees of 
success despite receiving the same grants of cash and land under 
ANCSA.22  With wide ranges in dividend payouts and annual 
returns, some “provided hundreds of high-wage jobs for their 
Native shareholders, while others provided none.”23  For instance, 
as of 1983, Cook Inlet Native Association and NANA, Inc. were 
generally successful, and Sealaska Corp. came in at 745th on 
Fortune’s list of the largest corporations in America, while Koniag, 
Inc. was having difficulty covering its bills.24  Notably, while ANCs 
like Bering Strait Native Corp. entered bankruptcy by 1988 after a 
series of bad local investments and Calista Corp. employed under 
ten persons by 1991, Cook Inlet Region, Inc. made national 
broadcasting acquisitions with partners “who were able to take 
advantage of the Natives’ minority status to get prefenences from” 
the Federal Communications Commission and earned more than 
 
 16. See 43 U.S.C. § 1606(j)–(m); COHEN ET AL., supra note 5, ch. 14 § A.  
Hereinafter in this Note, “ANCs” shall refer to both the thirteen regional 
corporations as well as the village corporations created under ANCSA. 
 17. Stephen Colt, Alaska Natives and the “New Harpoon”: Economic 
Performance of the ANCSA Regional Corporations, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 155, 155 (2005). 
 18. Martha Hirschfield, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Tribal 
Sovereignty and the Corporate Form, 101 YALE L. J. 1331, 1339 (1992). 
 19. See Summit, supra note 5, at 618. 
 20. Hirschfield, supra note 18, at 1339. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Colt, supra note 17, at 156. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See Wallace Turner, Alaska’s Native Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 
1983, at D5. 
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“the combined cumulative income of the other eleven regional 
corporations.”25 
This fledgling state gradually changed, however, when 
Congress took notice.  Michael Brown, a chief executive for one of 
Arctic Slope Regional Corporation’s subsidiaries, lobbied Congress 
in the 1980s, urging officials to examine the poverty and 
unemployment prevalent in rural Alaska villages.26  He found 
Senator Ted Stevens, who at the time headed the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, to be particularly receptive.27  In the 
1990s, the ANCs “dramatically improved their financial 
performance,” moving from red to black in terms of cumulative 
earnings between 1991 and 1998.28  A professor of economics at the 
University of Alaska in Anchorage pinpointed their seizure of 
“opportunities to provide professional and support services under 
contract to federal agencies” as one of four factors that led to this 
climb.29 
III.  THE ANC “EDGE”30 
A. The 8(a) Business Development Program 
The federal government’s policy of encouraging the 
participation of small businesses in government contracts was first 
announced during the Second World War amidst a heightened 
need to increase the industrial production base.31  Then, in 1953 the 
Small Business Administration (SBA) was created to contract with 
government procurement agencies to provide services and supplies, 
to subcontract with small businesses, and to encourage 
subcontracting by prime contractors with small businesses.32  This 
institution was made permanent by the Small Business Act of 1958 
(“Act”), which governed all types of procurement not just those 
 
 25. Colt, supra note 17, at 161–62 (emphasis omitted). 
 26. See Scherer, supra note 4, at 28; see also T. Christian Miller, Contracts 
Take Alaska to Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at A1. 
 27. See Scherer, supra note 4, at 28. 
 28. Colt, supra note 17, at 162–63. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr. & Scott Higham, Alaska Native Corporations 
Cash In on Contracting Edge, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2004, at A1. 
 31. Small Business Assistance Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-603, 56 Stat. 351 
(1942); see 48 JOHN C. MCBRIDE & THOMAS J. TOUHEY, GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTS: CYCLOPEDIC GUIDE TO LAW, ADMINISTRATION, PROCEDURE § 48.10 
(2005). 
 32. Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, 67 Stat. 232 (1953). 
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related to civil defense.33  Under the Act, a “small-business 
concern” was defined as a business “independently owned and 
operated and which is not dominant in its field of operation.”34 
The Act created a “Minority Small Business and Capital 
Ownership Development” program,35 commonly known as the 8(a) 
Business Development or 8(a) BD Program, in order “to assist 
eligible small disadvantaged business concerns compete in the 
American economy through business development.”36  Under the 
8(a) Program, the SBA has the power to contract with federal 
procurement agencies, departments, and officers to provide goods 
and services and to “arrange for the performance of such 
procurement contracts by negotiating or otherwise letting 
subcontracts to socially and economically disadvantaged small 
business concerns.”37  The phrase “negotiating or otherwise letting 
subcontracts” has been interpreted to mean that the SBA may 
award contracts to 8(a) Program small businesses without using the 
competitive bidding process mandated38 for the usual awards of 
federal procurement contracts.39  These subcontracts may thus be 
awarded either on a sole-source basis directly to a specific small 
business within the 8(a) Program or on a competitive basis in a 
competition restricted to 8(a) small businesses.40 
Under the procedures set out by the SBA, there are three 
basic ways for a government procurement agency’s contracting 
officer to offer an 8(a) contract: (1) through competition among all 
8(a) businesses that submit an offer; (2) as an open requirement, 
which means on a sole-source basis but without the nomination of a 
specific business; or (3) on a sole-source basis, offered on behalf of 
a specific business, in which case the procuring agency identifies in 
 
 33. Small Business Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384 (1958) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 631–657(f) (2000)). 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 632(a)(1) (2000). 
 35. See 15 U.S.C. § 636(j)(10) (2000). 
 36. 13 C.F.R. § 124.1 (2006). 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2000); see also 13 C.F.R. § 124.501(a). 
 38. See 41 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000) (stating that a procurement agency must 
obtain “full and open competition through the use of competitive procedures” to 
procure property and services); 41 U.S.C. § 253(c)(5) (stating that a procurement 
agency may dispense with competitive procedures when a statute “expressly 
authorizes or requires that the procurement be made. . .from a specified source”). 
 39. See Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696, 708–09 (5th 
Cir. 1973) (holding that “section 8(a) . . . clearly constitutes specific statutory 
authority to dispense with competition” and thus, “subcontracts under the section 
8(a) program may be awarded on a noncompetitive basis”). 
 40. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(C)–(D). 
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its letter a specific 8(a) business that it nominates to receive the 
award.41  In the first case, the SBA then accepts the procurement 
contract on behalf of the entire 8(a) Program, and the procuring 
agency conducts the competition and evaluates offers received in 
accordance with the procedures set out in the Federal Acquisition 
Regulations,42 which govern usual competitive government 
contracts.43  In the second case, the SBA selects an 8(a) business to 
receive the sole-source award, and in the third case, the SBA 
determines whether the nominated participant is an appropriate 
match for the sole-source award and may either negotiate the 
contract terms on behalf of the 8(a) business or authorize direct 
negotiations between the procuring agency and the 8(a) business.44  
In practice, when an 8(a) business becomes informed of a 
procuring agency’s interest in offering a particular contract, it may 
“pitch” or market itself to the agency to be nominated for the 
award.45 
Federal agencies are encouraged to offer contracts to minority 
businesses under the 8(a) Program because the Act also requires 
the President to establish annual set-aside goals for contracts 
awarded by all federal agencies to various classifications of small 
businesses, including small businesses under the 8(a) Program. 46  
Specifically, the head of each federal agency is to set the agency’s 
own goals, not to drop below an annual minimum of five percent of 
the total value of contracts and subcontracts issued by that 
agency.47 
B. Legal Substance of Preferences for ANCs 
Pursuant to its powers under the Act,48 the SBA has issued 
regulations that contain the legal substance of the preferences for 
ANCs.49  The edge ANCs enjoy above other 8(a) businesses 
consists primarily of their near automatic eligibility for the program 
 
 41. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.502(a)–(b). 
 42. 48 C.F.R. ch. 1. (2005). 
 43. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.507(a). 
 44. See 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.503(a)(2), 124.503(c), 124.503(d). 
 45. See T. Christian Miller, Army Outsources Security Positions, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 13, 2004, ¶ 29 available at http://www.adn.com/front/ 
story/5421063p-5357044c.html. 
 46. See 15 U.S.C. § 644(g) (2000). 
 47. Id. 
 48. 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(6) (2000). 
 49. 13 C.F.R. pt. 124. 
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and their exemption from the dollar limitation on the amount of 
awards that may be sole-sourced.50 
Eligibility for the 8(a) Program has two basic requirements.  
First, to qualify for participation in the 8(a) Program, a business 
must qualify as “small” according to size standards set out in a 
voluminous and complex set of separate regulations, the details of 
which are beyond the scope of this discussion.51  Generally 
speaking, for government procurement purposes, a business 
concern must meet a variety of size standards based on employee 
numbers, output or capacity volume, or annual receipts.52 
Second, to qualify for participation in the 8(a) Program, a 
small business must be “socially and economically disadvantaged,” 
which requires that it is at least fifty-one percent “unconditionally 
owned” by and that its “management and daily business 
operations” are controlled by: (1) “one or more socially and 
economically disadvantaged individuals,” (2) an “economically 
disadvantaged Indian tribe (or a wholly owned business entity of 
such a tribe),” or (3) “an economically disadvantaged Native 
Hawaiian organization.”53  “Indian tribe” is defined as “any Indian 
tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of 
Indians, including any Alaska Native village or regional or village 
corporation.”54  The Regulations explicitly define “Alaska Native 
Corporation” as those created under ANCSA.55 
As a special subgroup, business concerns owned by Indian 
tribes, ANCs, Native Hawaiian Organizations (NHOs), and 
Community Development Corporations (CDCs) are entitled to 
some benefits over and above most 8(a) businesses.56  For example, 
 
 50. See 43 U.S.C. § 1626(e)(1) (2000); 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.109(a)(2), 
124.109(a)(4), 124.506.  A full discussion of these preferences follows. 
 51. See generally 13 C.F.R. pt. 121 (2006). 
 52. See 13 C.F.R. §§ 121.201, 121.401, 121.402. 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(4) (2000); see also 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.105–106.  In 
addition, the applicant must have “reasonable prospects for success in competing 
in the private sector if admitted” to the program as well as demonstrate good 
character.  13 C.F.R. §§ 124.107–108(a).  “Economically disadvantaged individuals 
are those socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in the free 
enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit 
opportunities as compared to others in the same business area who are not socially 
disadvantaged.”  15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6).  To show oneself “economically 
disadvantaged,” individuals must submit a narrative statement and personal 
financial information.  13 C.F.R. § 124.104. 
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(13); see also 13 C.F.R. § 124.3. 
 55. 13 C.F.R. § 124.3. 
 56. Compare 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.105–108 (ownership, control, potential for 
success, and good character requirements) with §§ 124.109–111 (requirements with 
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they all benefit from a special exemption from the affiliate rule in 
size determinations.  In determining the size of most 8(a) 
businesses, the SBA includes the employees, receipts, or other 
measures of size for all the business’s foreign and domestic 
affiliates.57  For businesses owned and controlled by ANCs and 
Indian tribes, however, the size of the business is “determined 
independently without regard to its affiliation with the tribe, any 
entity of the tribal government, or any other business enterprise 
owned by the tribe,” unless one of these businesses might obtain “a 
substantial unfair competitive advantage . . . .”58  Similar rules apply 
to businesses owned by NHOs and CDCs.59  Therefore, businesses 
owned by ANCs, Indian tribes, NHOs, and CDCs are less likely to 
be ineligible on account of size.60 
Moreover, the structure of the definition of “socially and 
economically disadvantaged” indicates that those businesses falling 
under categories (2) and (3) are effectively exempted from 
demonstrating social disadvantage.61  Under these guidelines 
Native Americans (including American Indians, Eskimos, Aleuts, 
and Native Hawaiians), Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, 
and Asian Pacific Americans are all presumed to be “socially 
disadvantaged.”62  Individuals not belonging to these groups must 
demonstrate their social disadvantage through a long list of 
evidentiary requirements.63  Those individuals not belonging to one 
of these groups are clearly at a disadvantage as the burden is 
shifted to them to prove that they qualify as disadvantaged. 
Furthermore, they all are exempt from the requirement that 
persons conducting the 8(a) business’s management and daily 
operations be disadvantaged persons as defined under the 
regulations.64  So, while the regulations require that a tribally-
 
respect to the same four items for concerns owned by Indian tribes, NHOs, and 
CDCs, respectively). 
 57. 13 C.F.R. § 121.103(a)(6). 
 58. 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(2)(iii). 
 59. 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.110(b), 124.111(c). 
 60. See Size Appeals of: Valenzuela Eng’g, Inc. and Curry Contracting Co., 
No. 4151 (SBA Office of Hearings and Appeals Feb. 23, 1996), available at 
http://www.sba.gov/oha/allcases/sizecases/siz-4151.txt (denying a size protest 
against SMI, a wholly-owned subsidiary of The Aleut Corp., a regional 
corporation, that was based on a claim that it was affiliated with another wholly 
owned subsidiary of The Aleut Corp.). 
 61. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.109. 
 62. 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b). 
 63. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(c). 
 64. 13 C.F.R. § 124.106. 
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owned business be controlled by the tribe through a disadvantaged 
individual, non-tribal members may also manage the business if the 
SBA determines that this is required to assist its development.65 
Finally, businesses owned by Indian tribes, ANCs, NHOs, and 
CDCs are all exempt from the limitation on ownership of multiple 
8(a) businesses.  For most 8(a) businesses, participants may not 
own more than a ten to twenty percent ownership interest in 
another 8(a) business.66  Indian tribes, ANCs, NHOs, and CDCs, 
however, are prohibited only from owning more than fifty-one 
percent of another 8(a) business in the same primary line of 
business.67  Additionally, they may own an unlimited number of 
other 8(a) businesses that are in a different primary line of 
business, even if those other businesses have a secondary line of 
business identical to the primary business of the original 8(a) 
company.68 
Additionally, businesses owned by ANCs and Indian tribes 
enjoy particularly preferential status.  While the language of the 
provisions governing NHOs and CDCs still requires them to meet 
all eligibility criteria that apply to 8(a) businesses—as long as those 
criteria do not conflict with the special provisions for them—the 
provisions governing businesses owned by Indian tribes and ANCs 
contain no similar language.69  This effectively means that NHOs 
and CDCs are subject to much more detailed requirements than 
Indian tribes and ANCs.70 
Even among tribally-owned businesses, businesses owned by 
ANCs enjoy unique eligibility benefits that make them a very 
specific and small group of especially privileged 8(a) beneficiaries.71  
Like other businesses owned by Indian tribes, businesses owned by 
ANCs must meet size requirements applicable to all 8(a) 
participants.72  But while Indian tribe-owned businesses must 
establish economic disadvantage, ANCs and the businesses they 
own by a majority are automatically deemed to be economically 
 
 65. 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(4). 
 66. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.105(g)–(h).  The precise percentage of this limitation 
depends on disadvantaged status and other circumstances.  Id. 
 67. 13 C.F.R. §§124.109(c)(3)(ii), 124.110(c), 124.111(d). 
 68. 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.109(c)(3)(ii), 124.110(c), 124.111(d). 
 69. Compare 13 C.F.R. § 124.109 (requiring that ANCs meet only the 
requirements of § 124.112 to the extent it is not inconsistent) with §§ 124.110–111 
(requiring that NHOs and CDCs meet the requirements of §§ 124.101–108 and § 
124.112 to the extent they are not inconsistent). 
 70. See 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.109–111. 
 71. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(a). 
 72. 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(2). 
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disadvantaged under ANCSA.73  This is true as long as Alaska 
Natives or their descendants own “a majority of both the total 
equity of the ANC and the total voting powers.”74 
Arguably the most powerful preference for ANCs within the 
8(a) Program is the exemption from the dollar thresholds for sole-
source contracts, a benefit available exclusively to businesses 
owned by Indian tribes and ANCs—not NHOs, CDCs, or any 
other small or 8(a) business.75  A contract cannot be sole-sourced 
(in other words, 8(a) businesses must compete for the contract) if: 
(1) a “reasonable expectation” exists that at least two eligible 8(a) 
businesses will submit offers at fair market prices; (2) the price of 
the contract is anticipated to exceed five million dollars for 
contracts for manufacturing goods and three million dollars for 
other contracts; and (3) the contract was not accepted by the SBA 
“for award as a sole-source 8(a) procurement on behalf of a 
tribally-owned or ANC-owned concern.”76  Thus, the structure of 
these three requirements effectively exempts businesses owned by 
Indian tribes and ANCs from the dollar limitations on sole-source 
contracts.77 
C. Limitations on Constitutional and Procedural Protections 
The advantages for ANCs in receiving government contracts 
are amplified and entrenched by several factors that limit the 
extent to which outsiders can successfully challenge individual 
awards made based on those advantages. 
1. Constitutionality.  One potential way to challenge an award 
made to an ANC is to question the constitutionality of the 
advantages ANCs and other businesses enjoy under the 8(a) 
Program on Equal Protection grounds.  At least one court has 
rejected this line of attack.78 
In 1995, the Supreme Court examined a federal practice of 
giving monetary incentives for general contractors to hire minority 
subcontractors.79  The law at issue presumed “socially and 
 
 73. 43 U.S.C. § 1626(e)(1) (2000); 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(a)(2), (a)(4). 
 74. 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(a)(1), (a)(3). 
 75. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.506. 
 76. 13 C.F.R. § 124.506(a)(1). 
 77. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.506(b) (explicitly stating that the SBA may award a 
contract on a sole-source basis to such a business even where the anticipated value 
exceeds the thresholds). 
 78. See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. United States (AFGE), 330 F.3d 
513, 516–17, 520–21 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 1088 (2003). 
 79. Adardand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204–05 (1995). 
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economically disadvantaged individuals” to include “Black 
Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific 
Americans, and other minorities, or any other individual found to 
be disadvantaged by” section 8(a) of the Act.80  The Court held that 
all racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny and thus must 
be narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest.81  
One might thus expect that the application of the 8(a) Program to 
“Indian tribes” would be subjected, and fatally so, to strict 
scrutiny.82 
The 8(a) provisions applicable to Indian tribes and ANCs have 
not been directly challenged.  However, a 2003 opinion by the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, American 
Federation of Government Employees v. United States,83 makes it 
unlikely that a court would strike down those provisions on 
constitutional grounds.  AFGE upheld a provision of the Defense 
Appropriations Act of 200084 that allowed the federal government 
to bypass the normal award procedure for civil engineering 
contracts for firms with fifty-one percent “Native American” 
ownership.85  The court held that federal legislation with respect to 
Indian tribes is a political classification subject to rational scrutiny 
and that “Native American” in the law at issue actually referred to 
members of federally recognized Indian tribes, a political 
classification.86  At least two scholarly discussions have critized this 
distinction between racial and political classification of “Indian 
tribes.”87  Further, the Act clearly contemplates its own 
classification as one based on minority racial groups.88  Thus, even 
through the Supreme Court has denied certiorari, flaws in the 
 
 80. Id. at 205. 
 81. Id. at 227. 
 82. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.109 (applying different criteria to business concerns 
owned by Indian tribes and ANCs). 
 83. 330 F.3d 513 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 1088 (2003). 
 84. Pub. L. No. 106-79, § 8014(3) (1999). 
 85. AFGE, 330 F.3d at 516, 523. 
 86. Id. at 520–21. 
 87. See Jessica Lynn Clark, AFGE v. United States: The D.C. Circuit’s 
Preferential Treatment of the Native American Preference in Government Contract 
Awards, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 379, 398–404 (2005); Margaret B. Williams, Recent 
Decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: 
CHAPTER: Constitutional Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983, 1000–03 (2004). 
 88. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(a) (2006) (“Socially disadvantaged individuals are 
those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias within 
American society . . . .”). 
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AFGE court’s reasoning might leave the 8(a) Program open to 
future constitutional challenge.89 
2. Protests.  Another possibility for curbing the impact of the 
ANC edge is for other small and 8(a) businesses to protest 
particular awards of contracts to ANCs.  This approach is subject 
to several limitations, however, and is, in general, unlikely to 
succeed. 
For instance, the only challenge known to this author to a 
contract awarded to an ANC partnered with a large corporation on 
the grounds that the combined entity no longer qualifies as a 
“small” business was rejected.90  A small business receiving an 8(a) 
contract and its subcontractor are treated as joint venturers and 
thus are affiliates for the purposes of size determination if: (1) the 
subcontractor “performs primary and vital requirements of a 
contract” or (2) the prime contractor is “unusually reliant” upon it, 
determined with respect to a set of factors such as who manages 
the contract and what percentage of the work is subcontracted.91  
Thus, if a subcontractor performs too much of the work under the 
contract, the joint venture between it and an ANC may exceed 
small business size limitations.92  However, the only known protest 
based on this argument has been unsuccessful on this point.  A 
wholly-owned subsidiary of The Aleut Corp. subcontracted an 
award from the Air Force to Lockheed, a large business which then 
performed twenty percent of the labor under the contract.93  The 
SBA Office of Hearings and Appeals rejected a protester’s claim 
that the Alaska Native subsidiary would be unusually reliant on 
Lockheed and thus determined that they were not affiliates for size 
determination purposes.94  The office emphasized that the 
subsidiary managed the contract and was responsible for the bulk 
 
 89. 540 U.S. 1088 (2003).  Of course, even if these advantages are subject to 
strict scrutiny, they might be deemed to serve a compelling purpose. See Carole 
Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential” Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 943, 
955–56 (2002). 
 90. See Size Appeals of: Valenzuela Eng’g, Inc. and Curry Contracting Co., 
No. 4151 (SBA Office of Hearings and Appeals Feb. 23, 1996), available at 
http://www.sba.gov/oha/allcases/sizecases/siz-4151.txt. 
 91. 13 C.F.R. § 121.103(h)(4) (2006). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Size Appeals of: Valenzuela Eng’g, Inc. and Curry Contracting Co., No. 
4151 (SBA Office of Hearings and Appeals Feb. 23, 1996), available at 
http://www.sba.gov/oha/allcases/sizecases/siz-4151.txt. 
 94. Id. 
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of the work, and thus it performed “the vital and primary tasks of 
the contract.”95 
Another limitation on potential challenges to contracts 
awarded to ANCs is the inability of “any other party” to challenge 
the eligibility of an 8(a) business for an 8(a) contract before the 
SBA “or any administrative forum,” in a bid or other protest.96  
This means that no competing contractor can challenge the 
eligibility of an ANC for a particular contract.97 
Finally, the threshold for review of decisions to award 
contracts to 8(a) businesses is stacked high against a non-8(a) 
business wishing to protest the decision, even where the non-8(a) 
business had been performing that contract for a long time.  The 
Comptroller General, which handles certain government contract 
protests, takes the position that the SBA and contracting agencies 
have “broad discretion” to select procurement contracts for the 
8(a) Program.98  As a result, it will decline to hear any protest that a 
contract should not have been placed in the 8(a) Program unless 
the protester meets a burden of showing that the officials acted in 
bad faith or violated a specific law or regulation.99 
This barrier to protest can be seen in how easy it is for an 
incumbent non-8(a) business performing an existing contract with 
an agency to lose that contract to an ANC when there are changes 
to the contract.  Under its own regulations, the SBA does not 
accept a contract into the 8(a) Program if it would have an 
“adverse impact” on another small business.100  Such impact is 
presumed to exist where an incumbent small business had been 
performing the contract, unless changes to the contract effect a 
price change of at least twenty-five percent, in which case the 
contract is considered a “new requirement” and the protection for 
the incumbent does not apply.101  In at least two cases where 
incumbent contractors protested the award of their contract to an 
ANC under the 8(a) Program, they lost under the heavily 
deferential standard of review despite close disputes about whether 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. 13 C.F.R. § 124.517(a). 
 97. See id. 
 98. OMNI Gov’t Servs., Nos. B-297240.2; B-297240.3; B-297240.4 (Comp. 
Gen. Mar. 22, 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/2972402.pdf; 
Catapult Technology, Ltd., Nos. B-294936; B-294936.2 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 13, 
2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/294936.pdf. 
 99. Catapult Technology, Ltd., Nos. B-294936; B-294936.2 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 
13, 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/294936.pdf. 
 100. 13 C.F.R. § 124.504(c). 
 101. 13 C.F.R. § 124.504(c)(1)(ii)(C). 
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the requirement was “new.”102  In one case, the SBA even admitted 
that it had failed to perform an adverse impact analysis as required 
by its own regulations, but the Comptroller General denied the 
protest on grounds that the failure did not prejudice the 
protester.103  Even if the SBA had performed such an analysis, the 
Comptroller General concluded, deference is owed to the SBA’s 
interpretation of its own regulations.104  The SBA interpretation 
gives the SBA discretion to find adverse impact not to exist even if 
the presumption for adverse impact is met.105  These unsuccessful 
challenges indicate that a heavily deferential standard of review 
limits the usefulness of the protest system for incumbents losing 
contracts to ANCs under the 8(a) Program. 
IV.  8(A) ADVANTAGES IN PRACTICE 
The use of the ANC edge in the award and performance of 
sole-source government contracts has been a mixed story of rags-
to-riches and loophole exploitation.106  The advantages available to 
ANCs and other tribally-owned corporations have been thought to 
be responsible for a large jump in the value of 8(a) contracts in 
recent years, which doubled from $5.6 billion in 2002 to $10.1 
billion just one year later.107  The size of the contracts awarded to 
ANCs and their partners has been a surprise relative to the original 
visions for the program.  Contracting officials at the Pentagon, for 
instance, thought the exemptions for ANCs would be used to 
procure “occasional small contracts, not as a way to bypass federal 
competitive-bidding rules for $100 million projects” for “everything 
under the sun.”108  Government contracts to native-owned 
 
 102. See OMNI Gov’t Servs., Nos. B-297240.2; B-297240.3; B-297240.4 (Comp. 
Gen. Mar. 22, 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/2972402.pdf; 
Catapult Technology, Ltd., Nos. B-294936; B-294936.2 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 13, 
2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/294936.pdf (denying such 
protests). 
 103. See OMNI Gov’t Servs., Nos. B-297240.2; B-297240.3; B-297240.4 (Comp. 
Gen. Mar. 22, 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/2972402.pdf. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Compare, e.g., Allison Connolly, A Tiny Alutiiq Village in Alaska is 
Reaping Millions in Defense Contracts in Hampton Roads and Throughout the 
Country as a Result of Laws Giving Its Company Preferential Treatment as 
Restitution for Lost Land, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 17, 2005, at A1, with 
O’Harrow & Higham, supra note 30, at A1. 
 107. Jim Snyder, Native Corporation Trade Association Forms, THE HILL, Feb. 
9, 2005, at 15. 
 108. See Scherer, supra note 4, at 28. 
05__YANG.DOC 1/10/2007  8:49 AM 
330 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [23:315 
companies rose steadily between 1999 and 2003 and spiked sharply 
in 2003, with the vast majority of the value of the contracts being 
sole-sourced.109  By 2003, when native corporations received $1.3 
billion in such sole-sourced contracts, accounting for almost fifteen 
percent of the 8(a) Program, the advantages and exemptions for 
ANCs have made some small village corporations “rising giant[s] in 
the world of federal contracting.”110 
The public attention in the past year and a half, however, has 
been much more focused on a few high-profile cases of alleged 
abuse of exclusive 8(a) privileges by ANCs and their partners.111  
Three themes seem to run through the recent flurry of public 
discussion of ANCs and their 8(a) edge that may explain the 
antagonistic atmosphere in mainstream media.  First, as will 
become clear in the discussion to follow, many of the most high-
profile ANC contracts have been awarded by the Department of 
Defense.  Neal Fried, an economist at Alaska’s Department of 
Labor, has noted that ANCs depending on Alaska’s natural 
resources have struggled while “those that have joined the war 
effort have thrived.”112  Since that agency annually doles out the 
“bulk of federal acquisition dollars,” any tendency to grant 
contracts to ANCs somewhat reflects a trend in government 
procurement as a whole.113 
Second, the fact that many of the largest contract awards have 
been for work in security and defense implicates a heightened 
degree of public concern in the post-September 11 world.  Several 
subsidiaries of ANCs have been sole-source awarded million-dollar 
contracts issued by the Department of Defense for military and 
reconstruction work in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as at home.114  
For example, days after September 11, a $2.2 billion contract for 
management of information technology systems issued by the 
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency was sole-sourced to 
Chenega and Arctic Slope, two of the thirteen regional 
corporations, an award that “raised eyebrows.”115  Moreover, in 
2002, the Customs Service awarded a $500 million contract for 
 
 109. See id. (Chart: Government Contracts to Tribal Companies). 
 110. See id. at 26. 
 111. See, e.g., O’Harrow & Higham, supra note 30, at A1; Miller, supra note 26, 
at A1; Turner, supra note 24, at D5. 
 112. Connolly, supra note 106, at A1. 
 113. Major Thomas J. Hasty, III, Minority Business Enterprise Development 
and the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) Program: Past, Present, and (Is There 
a) Future? 145 MIL. L. REV. 1, 87 (1994). 
 114. See Scherer, supra note 4, at 28–29. 
 115. Connolly, supra note 106, at A1. 
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maintenance of customs inspection equipment on a sole-source 
basis to Chenega Technology Services Corp.116  Chenega Corp., as 
noted by The Washington Post, had  “little experience” doing this 
type of work, prompting it to subcontract to big companies with no 
native ownership.117 
The third factor fueling negative media attention is the ANCs’ 
use of large multinational corporations as subcontractors.  For 
example, over $225 million in military construction contracts were 
awarded to Olgoonik Corporation, a village corporation based in 
the small village of Wainwright, Alaska.118  Much of the work under 
these contracts is being performed not by Wainwright natives but 
by Olgoonik’s partner, Halliburton.119 
The role of these large corporate entities illustrates the 
primary criticism of the ANC edge: that it creates a loophole 
through which corporate entities that would not themselves qualify 
for small or minority business assistance may, without competition, 
access work under contracts of unlimited dollar value by becoming 
a subcontractor for an ANC.120  For instance, two names that 
surface time and again in media discussion of ANCs’ government 
contracting advantages are Wackenhut Services and Vance 
International.  These large security firms which have been 
subcontracted by Alutiiq Security and Technology, a subsidiary of 
Afognak Native Corp., and Chenega Corp., respectively, to fulfill 
defense contracts issued by the Pentagon to install guards at 
military bases across the country.121  Specifically, Wackenhut serves 
as Alutiiq’s subcontractor, and, while they jointly recruit security 
guards, they specify in the contract that fifty-one percent of them 
are to be considered Alutiiq employees and the other forty-nine 
percent Wackenhut employees.122  Critics charge that allowing 
ANCs to subcontract with the likes of Wackenhut and Vance, 
which otherwise would not qualify for small business government 
contracting advantages, has created a loophole through which these 
large non-minority and non-disadvantaged corporations are able to 
 
 116. O’Harrow & Higham, supra note 30, at A1. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Scherer, supra note 4, at 26. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Leslie Wayne, Security for the Homeland, Made in Alaska, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 12, 2004, at C1. 
 121. Id.; T. Christian Miller, Army Turns to Private Guards, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
12, 2004, at A1; Jay Price & Joseph Neff, Tribes Reap No-Bid Deals, THE NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Nov. 28, 2004, at A1. 
 122. Miller, supra note 121, at A1. 
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access enormous government contracts noncompetitively.123  So, 
when the Pentagon awarded a contract with a face value of $194 
million (and which could be worth up to $500 million with the 
exercise of options) to provide security guards at military bases to 
the Alutiiq/Wackenhut and Chenega/Vance joint ventures without 
using competitive bidding, it was not constrained by the dollar 
threshold on contracts that could be sole-sourced in this manner 
because the ANC recipients are exempt from such limitations.124  
Thus Wackenhut and Vance have been called the “main 
beneficiaries” of these deals because by partnering with ANCs, 
they can access these multi-million dollar contracts on a sole-source 
basis.125 
Such partnerships are indeed a smart move for both firms 
involved, as the ANC might lack experience that its large 
subcontracting partner can provide in return for access to the 
contract.  Thus “Alutiiq provided the contracting speed, and 
Wackenhut provided the experience.”126  With the boom in 
contracts awarded to ANCs in recent years, partnerships between 
these corporations and large multinational businesses also 
“skyrocketed,” in a phenomenon described by federal procurement 
experts as “a loophole gone wild.”127  Thus, critics complain that a 
law intended to benefit ANCs is being used to extend special 
advantages to non-disadvantaged corporations.128  Military officials 
cite the urgency with which private security manpower is needed to 
replace the soldiers being shipped overseas to Iraq, but critics 
respond that “in the long run,” the no-bid nature of these contracts 
is accompanied by “no accountability, no oversight and no 
alternatives if the performance is not good.”129 
To further arm critics on this point, both Wackenhut and 
Vance have lost bids on other military contracts when forced to bid 
competitively.130  Thus these are not only corporations that do not 
qualify for small or minority business assistance, but they are also 
corporations that have failed to perform adequately in the 
competitive process, implying that they are now accessing valuable 
contracts they might not deserve.131  To add fuel to the fire, as well 
 
 123. Wayne, supra note 120, at C1. 
 124. Id.; 13 C.F.R. § 124.506(b) (2006). 
 125. Wayne, supra note 120, at C1. 
 126. Miller, supra note 121, at A1. 
 127. Scherer, supra note 4, at 26. 
 128. Wayne, supra note 120, at C1. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.; Scherer, supra note 4, at 28. 
 131. Id. 
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as another layer of aggravation for watchdog organizations,132 
Wackenhut’s foreign ownership and questions of its competency 
have led to concerns about the appropriateness of awarding it 
important national-security contracts.133  For instance, Wackenhut 
had previously been “reprimanded for underperforming” on its 
other federal contracts at the time it received the Pentagon deal.134 
The strength of these criticisms has, in at least two instances, 
“stymied” no-bid contracts of this nature.  In 2004, a forty million 
dollar contract issued by the Energy Department to provide 
security services in Idaho nuclear laboratories was initially sole-
sourced to Alutiiq and Wackenhut.135  The contract was later 
withdrawn after Idaho congressmen opposed the deal, pointing out 
that Wackenhut was accessing the work without competition.136  
That same year, the Transportation Security Administration 
abandoned plans to sole-source a technology maintenance contract 
to Chenega and decided to open it for competitive bidding because 
“the competitive bidding process provides the right avenue to a 
contractor that will provide the government the best value” and 
thus is what the agency should do as “good stewards of the 
taxpayers’ dollars.”137 
The culmination, perhaps, of the public scrutiny into ANC 
contracting advantages took place in March of 2005 when 
Representative Thomas M. Davis III (R-Virginia), Chairman of 
the House Government Reform Committee, and Representative 
Henry A. Waxman (D-California) jointly signed letters to the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) requesting an 
investigation of defense and military contracts awarded to ANCs.138  
In similar letters to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
the Pentagon, and the State Department, they requested 
documents and information on such contracts.139  The two letters 
 
 132. See Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Case Study, Alutiiq’s ‘back-door deal’ 
with Wackenhut, http://www.ancwatch.org (click “Case Study” in the left-hand list) 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2006). 
 133. Wayne, supra note 120, at C1. 
 134. Scherer, supra note 4, at 28. 
 135. Wayne, supra note 120, at C1; Press Release, PR Newswire, After 
Criticism, U.S. Energy Dep’t. Opts to Keep Idaho Nuclear Lab Security In-House 
(May 6, 2004). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., TSA Reconsiders Technology Contract, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 30, 2004, at A4. 
 138. Scott Higham & Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Probe of Security Contracts 
Sought, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2005, at A4. 
 139. Id. 
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single out ANCs as the recipients of sole-source federal contracts 
that have increased in number and value,140 a phenomenon said to 
raise “important questions about whether the interests of the 
taxpayer are being protected.”141  The letter sent to the DHS, the 
Pentagon, and the State Department requested audits, price 
reasonableness assessments, and reports for sole-source contracts 
awarded to ANCs by several defense agencies.142  The letter also 
specifically requested documents, especially performance 
assessments and decisions or justification documents, for several of 
the high-profile, large-dollar-value contracts to ANCs, including: 
the $2.2 billion contract by the National Geospatial Intelligence 
Agency to Chenega and Arctic Slope, the Army contracts to 
Alutiiq/Wackenhut and Chenega/Vance for security guards, the 
Customs Service’s $500 million contract for maintenance of 
customs inspection services awarded to Chenega Technology 
Services Corporation, the Transportation Security Administration 
to Chenega in 2004, and the $225 million contracts to Olgoonik for 
military base construction work.143  Additionally, the letter to the 
GAO was accompanied by a list of specific questions requested for 
review by the GAO, including how many native Alaskans were 
employed by the ANCs to work under the contracts, whether 
federal officials could be sure that the price of contracts to ANCs 
was reasonable, and what the impact of ANC contracts was on 
“native Alaskan” employment, income, education, and economic 
development.144 
V.  ANSWERS FROM THE HILL 
Starting in the spring of 2006, the government began issuing 
responses that appeared to echo and confirm the media’s 
 
 140. Letter from Tom Davis, House Representative and Chairman of the 
House Comm. on Gov’t Reform, and Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority 
Member of the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform, to David M. Walker, U.S. 
Comptroller Gen. (Mar. 4, 2005) available at http://www.democrats.reform. 
house.gov/Documents/20040204161047-71446.pdf [hereinafter Letter to GAO]; 
Letter from Tom Davis, House Representative and Chairman of the House 
Comm. on Gov’t Reform, and Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member of 
the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform, to Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., 
Michael Chertoff, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., and Condoleezza Rice, Sec’y of State 
(Mar. 4, 2005) available at http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/ 
20050304160958-87063.pdf [hereinafter Letter to DHS, DOD, and State Dept.] 
 141. Letter to DHS, DOD, and State Dept., supra note 140, at 1. 
 142. Id. at 2–4. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Letter to GAO, supra note 140, at 3–4. 
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suspicions and grievances toward the ANC edge.  In April, two 
separate reports from the GAO singled out ANCs in citing 
inadequate oversight in government contracting, one in response to 
questions about the Army’s management of its acquisition 
program,145 and the other in response to the letters of 
Representatives Davis and Waxman.146  Then, in June, a 
congressional hearing was convened to answer the issues raised by 
the latter of these reports.147 
The April 2006 GAO report charged that the Army had relied 
heavily and inappropriately on 8(a) sole-source contracts for its 
program of supplying security guards to military installations in the 
U.S.148  According to the GAO’s findings, two of the four firms 
providing security personnel under these guard contracts are 
ANCs, and the Army sole-sourced contracts totaling $495 million 
to these two ANCs.149  The criticism focused on the fact that the 
Army did this even though: (1) competitive procedural alternatives 
were available that were not conclusively shown to be more 
burdensome than sole-sourcing; (2) the ANCs were of dubitable 
qualification to provide the contract personnel; and (3) competitive 
contracts the Army used at the same time cost less.150  The report 
also zeroed in on the ANCs’ practice of subcontracting up to forty-
nine percent of the work to large security firms, citing that $200 
million had been subcontracted under the guard contracts as of 
December 2005.151  The report further criticized the adequacy of 
the security guards being supplied under the Army’s contracts, 
pointing to evidence of inadequacy in screening procedures and 
training of the personnel.152  Though these portions of the report 
 
 145. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ARMY’S GUARD PROGRAM 
REQUIRES GREATER OVERSIGHT AND REASSESSMENT OF ACQUISITION 
APPROACH, GAO-06-284 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d06284.pdf [hereinafter GAO GUARD PROGRAM REPORT]. 
 146. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INCREASED USE OF ALASKA 
NATIVE CORPORATIONS’ SPECIAL 8(A) PROVISIONS CALLS FOR TAILORED 
OVERSIGHT, GAO-06-399 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d06399.pdf [hereinafter GAO 8(A) REPORT]. 
 147. See Northern Lights and Procurement Plights: The Effect of the ANC 
Program on Federal Procurement and Alaska Native Corporations Before the H. 
Comm. on Government Reform and the H. Comm. on Small Business, 109th Cong. 
(2006) (opening statement of Chairman Tom Davis), available at 
http://reform.house.gov/GovReform/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=45302. 
 148. GAO GUARD PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 145, at 2. 
 149. Id. at 8, 9. 
 150. Id. at 9, 13–14. 
 151. Id. at 15. 
 152. Id. at 16, 20. 
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did not single out ANCs, the implication that the inadequacies of 
the personnel can be traced to the inadequacy of the ANCs’ 
performance seems quite clear given the report’s emphasis on the 
Army’s heavy reliance on ANCs for these contracts.153  The GAO 
concluded by calling for stronger Army oversight of its contracting 
process and urged among six other recommendations that the 
Army “reassess its acquisition strategy for contract security 
guards,” and, in particular, that it use competitive procedures for 
contracts in the future.154 
The GAO report in response to the letters of Representatives 
Davis and Waxman followed slightly over two weeks later and 
reflected broader concerns over ANC participation in the 8(a) 
Program.155  The report provided some concrete data on ANC 
participation in federal 8(a) contracts, painting a picture that 
seemed to substantiate the media perception that the 8(a) Program 
is a substantial part of the life of an ANC and that ANCs, in turn, 
dominate the 8(a) landscape.  According to the GAO’s findings, 4.6 
billion total federal dollars were obligated to ANCs from 2000 to 
2004, 63%, or $2.9 billion, of which were through the 8(a) Program; 
77%156 of that $2.9 billion were sole-source awards.157  Moreover, 
the ANC share of the 8(a) pie appears to be growing as 8(a) dollars 
to ANCs increased from $265 million in 2000 to $1.1 billion in 2004, 
representing a growth from 5% to 13% of total 8(a) dollars 
devoted to ANCs.158 
The central conclusion of the GAO report, however, is that 
oversight by contracting agencies is unduly lax, particularly in 
enforcing limitations on subcontracting of awards sole-sourced to 
ANCs under the 8(a) Program.159  Rather than pointing to ANCs or 
the firms who subcontract with them as abusers of the system, the 
GAO focused on the inadequate oversight of contracting officials, 
who are “confused about whose responsibility it is to monitor 
compliance with the subcontracting limitations,” as well as “unclear 
about how to monitor” such limitations.160  The GAO also 
 
 153. Id. at 9. 
 154. Id. at 32–33. 
 155. GAO 8(A) REPORT, supra note 146. 
 156. The seventy-seven percent figure reflects GAO analysis of six different 
agencies.  Id. at 11. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 11–12. 
 159. Id. at 21 (finding “almost no evidence that the agencies are effectively 
monitoring compliance with this requirement, particularly where 8(a) ANC firms 
have partnered with large firms”). 
 160. Id. at 21–22. 
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suggested that there is some conscious circumvention of the 
system, citing contracting officers who say they are often 
approached directly by large firms wanting to “partner” with 
ANCs.161  Additionally, there was as at least one allegation of a 
“pass-through” contract in which an agency awarded the contract 
to an ANC with the explicit requirement that a large firm, which it 
actually wanted to use but to which it could not sole-source, do 
“most of the work” as a subcontractor.162  The report also suggests 
that some contracting agencies consider contracts with ANCs to be 
an “open checkbook” and that they expect few checks on 
compliance with the rules.163 
Blame also fell on the SBA.  The GAO admonished the SBA 
for failing to ensure that ANCs’ multiple subsidiaries were not 
generating 8(a) revenue in the same primary lines of business, 
which the regulations prohibit,164 failing to protect other incumbent 
small businesses from losing contracts to sole-source opportunities 
to ANCs, failing to make size determinations with sufficient 
reference to whether admitting an ANC into the 8(a) Program 
would produce unfair competitive advantage,165 failing to 
sufficiently monitor whether large firms are taking undue 
advantage of partnership relationships with ANCs, and failing to 
maintain adequate information on ANCs and their 8(a) activities in 
general.166 
The GAO report concluded by calling upon the SBA to “tailor 
its regulations and policies as well as to provide greater oversight in 
practice” and for contracting agencies to “ensure that [ANCs] are 
operating in the program as intended.”167  Several 
recommendations require the SBA to revise its regulations and 
policies to amend the shortcomings pointed out in the report, while 
requiring specific contracting agencies to develop guidance for 
ensuring contract compliance.168 
 
 161. Id. at 22–23. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 17.  One contracting officer was quoted describing contracting with 
ANCs as an “open checkbook,” referring to the lack of dollar limitations.  Id.  
Another contracting officer was quoted as saying he would be “‘laughed out of the 
office’” for attempting to terminate an ANC contract for lack of compliance with 
subcontracting limitations.  Id. at 23. 
 164. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(3)(ii) (2006). 
 165. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(2)(iii). 
 166. GAO 8(A) REPORT, supra note 146, at 33. 
 167. Id. at 39. 
 168. Id. at 40–41. 
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Though the SBA expressly disagreed with and criticized some 
of the recommendations,169 three days after the release of the final 
GAO report, it quietly published a proposed package of five 
amendments to the 8(a) Program regulations.170 One of these 
amendments would change the rules to exclude sole-source 
contracts to joint ventures between a tribally-owned business or 
ANC within the 8(a) Program and “other concerns” from the 
exemption from the dollar limitation on sole-source contracts.171 
Another amendment would permit NHOs to secure defense 
contracts above the competitive threshold.172  As for the part 
involving NHOs, the Department of Defense has followed through 
cooperatively by adopting, in June 2006, a final rule amending its 
own acquisition regulations to permit awarding sole-source 
contracts to NHOs above the five million and three million dollar 
thresholds.173  It remains to be seen whether the recommendation 
to exclude joint ventures from the dollar limit exemption will be 
adopted.174 
Yet another GAO report was released in May that 
tangentially addressed the ANC edge in an investigation of waste 
in contracting, concluding that the Army Corps of Engineers sole-
sourced a $39.5 million contract for construction of classrooms in 
the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 despite being in possession 
of information that the classrooms should have cost much less.175  
The Corps, the GAO concluded, “could have, but failed to, 
negotiate a lower price.”176 
VI.  POLICIES, COSTS, BENEFITS, AND SOLUTIONS 
These results of the congressional investigations as well as the 
volume of negative media attention on the ANC edge call for an 
 
 169. Id. app. II at 53–54. 
 170. 8(a) Business Development/Small Disadvantaged Business Status 
Determinations, 71 Fed. Reg. 23,498 (Apr. 24, 2006). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Sole Source 8(a) 
Awards to Small Business Concerns Owned by Native Hawaiian Organizations, 71 
Fed. Reg. 34,831 (June 16, 2006) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. § 219.805-1). 
 174. The proposal package is accompanied by no legal deadline.  See 8(a) 
Business Development/Small Disadvantaged Business Status Determinations, 71 
Fed. Reg. at 23,498. 
 175. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HURRICANE KATRINA, ARMY 
CORPS OF ENGINEERS CONTRACT FOR MISSISSIPPI CLASSROOMS, GAO-06-454 
(2006), at 1–2. 
 176. Id. at 2. 
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evaluation of whether the edge is still, or ever was, justified, both as 
a policy and in terms of its costs.  This question is inherently 
complex because it requires balancing several distinct interests that 
cannot be ordered and may not be compatible.  These include the 
interests of Alaska Natives (especially those in Alaska’s still 
impoverished rural villages), the interests of other small and 
disadvantaged businesses, the interests of taxpayers, the interest in 
having affirmative action that is fair, and the interest in maintaining 
competition in federal procurement.  Such a multifaceted issue 
does not present an easy solution, such as the complete removal of 
the ANCs from the 8(a) Program, as some have indeed 
suggested.177  The remainder of this Note is an attempt to untangle 
the various competing interests involved in the controversy over 
the ANC edge, in order to: (1) ask whether the edge makes good 
sense both as a policy and in terms of costs and benefits and (2) 
evaluate some possible solutions.  Ultimately, this Note will show 
that the most serious flaw of the ANC edge is that it fosters a 
dependency by ANCs that is not only problematic policy-wise and 
cost-wise, but that also makes any balanced remedies difficult. 
A. Consistency with the Policy of the Act and the 8(a) Program 
1. Unique Power to Circumvent Competition.  The powerful 
exemption of ANCs from the dollar limitation on amounts they can 
receive on a sole-source basis makes them more disconnected than 
other 8(a) businesses from the Act’s policy of promoting 
competition.178  The Act as a whole, as well as the 8(a) Program 
itself, embodies Congress’s underlying policy of promoting 
competition in federal procurement by fostering the ability of small 
and minority businesses to participate in that competitive 
process.179  For instance, the Act was premised on the idea that 
developing the potential of small businesses is essential to free 
 
 177. See Northern Lights and Procurement Plights, The Effect of the ANC 
Program on Federal Procurement and Alaska Native Corporations Before the H. 
Comm. on Gov’t Reform and the H. Comm. on Small Business, 109th Cong. (2006) 
(statement of Harry C. Alford, President/CEO, National Black Chamber of 
Commerce, Inc.), available at http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/NBCC%20-
%20Alford%20Testimony.pdf [hereinafter Alford Statement]; Nat’l Indian Bus. 
Ass’n., Senator Kerry’s Staff Scrutinizes Congressional Investigation of Alaska 
Native Corporations, http://www.nibanetwork.org/ANC%20Article.htm (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Nat’l Indian Bus. Ass’n.]. 
 178. See 15 U.S.C. § 631(a), 631(f)(2) (2000). 
 179. See id. 
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competition in private enterprise.180  Thus, it sought to ensure that 
“a fair proportion” of federal contracts is allotted to these small 
businesses.181  The 8(a) Program specifically was to serve as a “tool 
for developing business ownership among groups that own and 
control little productive capital.”182  The goal of advancing such 
development was also to encourage “competition among such 
suppliers . . . .”183  Thus, the purpose of the 8(a) Program was 
grounded not in a minority preference policy but in a competition 
policy of helping small, disadvantaged businesses “compete on an 
equal basis.”184 
ANCs, like other 8(a) businesses, are able to circumvent the 
competitive process for government contracts by receiving sole-
source awards, and their ability to receive such awards without 
dollar limitation allows them to achieve that circumvention to a 
greater extent than other 8(a) businesses.185  As a matter of policy, 
this exemption from the dollar limitation is the most significant 
benefit for ANCs and other tribally-owned businesses because it 
marks the deepest cut into the ideal of “free competitive 
enterprise.”186  Specifically, the dollar limitation threshold serves as 
an important limitation on the ability of most 8(a) businesses to 
circumvent the competitive process for government contracts and 
receive them directly.  Exempting ANCs and other tribally-owned 
businesses from that limitation places them further away than other 
8(a) businesses from compliance with the policy goal of free 
competitive enterprise that was behind the Act and the 8(a) 
Program.187  Almost as if to highlight this question, the SBA 
explicitly declares that no requirement exists that a procurement be 
“competed whenever possible before it can be accepted on a sole-
source basis for a tribally-owned or ANC-owned concern.”188 
2. Fostering Dependent ANCs.  Furthermore, the use of the 
ANC edge in practice indicates that the rationales that justify the 
 
 180. See 15 U.S.C. § 631(a). 
 181. Id. 
 182. 15 U.S.C. § 631(d)(2)(A)(vi). 
 183. 15 U.S.C. § 631(f)(1). 
 184. 15 U.S.C. § 631(f)(2). 
 185. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.506(b) (2006). 
 186. 15 U.S.C. § 631(a). 
 187. See 15 U.S.C. § 631(f)(2). 
 188. 13 C.F.R. § 124.506(b).  The provision clarifies that, while a contract 
cannot be removed from competition once it has already been placed there, it can 
be granted to an Indian- or ANC-owned corporation without ever going through 
standard competitive procedures. 
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ability of 8(a) businesses to circumvent the competitive process are 
not met in the case of ANCs.189  The 8(a) Program allows for sole-
sourcing of awards to eligible businesses to “promote the business 
development of” such businesses in order to train them to 
“compete on an equal basis in the American economy.”190  This 
rationale is premised on Congress’s belief that, at the time of the 
Act’s passage, small businesses were incapable of receiving federal 
contracts through the competitive process and that encouraging 
their participation in procurement by permitting them to partially 
circumvent that process would allow them to eventually become 
self-sufficient, viable businesses capable of competing effectively in 
the marketplace.191  Consistent with this rationale, small businesses 
that participate in the program “graduate” after nine years of 
participation,192 or earlier if the SBA determines that they have 
“demonstrated the ability to compete in the marketplace without 
assistance” or that they are no longer economically 
disadvantaged.193  In general, they are not then eligible to re-enroll 
into the program.194 
In the case of ANCs, however, the legal advantages that allow 
ANCs to receive enormous contracts without going through the 
competitive process cultivate a dependency on those advantages.195  
For instance, at least one commentator has pointed out that the 
ability to access sole-source contracts with no dollar limitation 
“reduce[s] the incentive to develop the skills, infrastructure and 
core competencies that are necessary to become a viable business 
in a competitive market” and that this actually constitutes a 
“disservice to ANCs” because the companies’ future generations 
are not being “prepared for the day when ANCs no longer receive 
special treatment or must compete with hungrier firms.”196  For 
example, should an ANC graduate or become so profitable that it 
no longer qualifies for the 8(a) Program, it will not be able to 
access multi-million dollar sole-source contracts, yet it will not have 
 
 189. See 15 U.S.C. § 631(f)(2). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696, 708 (5th Cir. 
1973). 
 192. 13 C.F.R. § 124.2. 
 193. 13 C.F.R. § 124.302. 
 194. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.108(b) (“Once a concern or a disadvantaged individual 
upon whom eligibility was based has participated in the 8(a) BD program, neither 
the concern nor that individual will be eligible again.”). 
 195. See Dave Nadler, Contracting Advantages Do Not Prepare Alaska Firms 
for Future Competition, Mar. 7, 2005,  http://www.fcw.com/article88164-03-06-05. 
 196. Id. 
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developed the building blocks to win these contracts through 
competitive bidding.197  This is because the sole-source awards did 
not train it to compete, and the size of those awards did not force it 
to supplement its income with other economic activities.198  Akin to 
a transfer payment rather than a training program targeted at 
economic sovereignty, the ANC edge in this way cultivates long-
term dependence. 
The GAO’s 2006 findings shed light on the possibility that 
some ANCs, having outgrown the sheltered harbor of the 8(a) 
Program, are nevertheless reluctant to wade into the open waters 
of competitive contracting.  In connection with its conclusions on 
SBA oversight, the GAO focused a substantial portion of its report 
on the sophistication of ANCs’ business practices.  For instance, 
ANCs engage in a variety of structural maneuvers in order to 
promote their revenue-generating power under the 8(a) Program, 
including the ownership of several subsidiaries, each of which also 
participates in the 8(a) Program.199  They recruit non-Alaska Native 
outside management to pilot their 8(a) operations (often for 
compensation that is significantly higher than that of other 
executives), hire marketing firms to help secure contracts, enter 
into joint ventures and partnerships with non-8(a) businesses as 
well as 8(a) businesses, and create holding companies.200 
It appears from the report that, using these practices, ANCs 
have pushed the edge that they hold under the 8(a) Program to its 
legal limits.  The report singles out the creation of multiple 
subsidiaries, each of which participates in the 8(a) Program, as a 
“Key Practice.”201  It also gives examples in which a subsidiary has 
been created in anticipation of the graduation of an existing 
subsidiary or the expiration of that subsidiary’s 8(a) contract, so 
that the new subsidiary will take on a “follow-on” contract to 
essentially continue the work of the former subsidiary under the 
8(a) Program.202  This practice has continued despite the GAO 
report’s less-than-glowing depiction of it.  For instance, as recently 
as August 2006, the National Guard decided to award Bowhead 
Manufacturing a $300 million, five-year no-bid contract, just as a  
 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.109(c)(3)(ii), 124.110(c), 124.111(d). 
 200. GAO 8(A) REPORT, supra note 146, at 25–32. 
 201. Id. at 25. 
 202. Id. at 28 tbl. 4. 
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$50 million, five-year no-bid contract with another subsidiary of 
Bowhead Manufacturing’s ANC parent company was expiring.203 
The GAO’s dissection of ANCs’ business practices led to the 
conclusion that the SBA has failed to “tailor[] its policies and 
practices to account for ANCs’ . . . growth in federal contracting, 
even though officials recognize that ANCs enter into more 
complex business relationships than other 8(a) participants.”204  The 
implication appears to be that as ANCs have developed into 
sophisticated business entities able to use complex business 
practices to maximize their revenue-generating power, they have 
outgrown the protective shelter of the 8(a) Program, which must 
now be adjusted to be less deferential to them. 
The practices of creating subsidiaries to take on follow-on 
contracts and of creating holding companies205 have the effect of 
perpetuating the ANC’s benefit from the 8(a) Program when it 
possibly has outgrown the preference.  The circumvention of 
graduation and other aspects of the 8(a) Program not only diverts 
8(a) resources and opportunities away from new small 
disadvantaged businesses but also hurts the ANCs by delaying their 
entry into the world of competitive contracting.  This can thwart 
the development of any accompanying drive to prepare their 
businesses to succeed in that world. 
Thus, the ANCs themselves can be said to be adversely 
impacted by their preferential access to government contracts.  The 
degree to which ANCs and their shareholders may flounder 
without the ANC edge might be tested in the near future, as the 
Army decided in April 2006 against renewing its security guard 
contracts with Chenega Integrated Solutions and Alutiiq Security 
and Technology in response to the GAO’s report on the Army’s 
acquisition program.206  Both Alutiiq and Chenega have expressed 
their intent to bid for the contracts competitively following this 
decision.207  Whether or not they succeed may provide an isolated 
but still important indicator of the performance of ANCs in a 
competitive environment. 
 
 203. Pamela Hess, Analysis: $300M, No-bid Guard Contract, UNITED PRESS 
INT’L, Aug. 16, 2006, available at http://www.upi.com/SecurityTerrorism/ 
view.php?StoryID=20060816-033059-5548r. 
 204. GAO 8(A) REPORT, supra note 146, at 33. 
 205. ANCs engage in these practices in part to share administrative employees 
between subsidiaries so that the subsidiaries may maintain a “lean staff” and avoid 
losing their eligibilty for 8(a) participation due to size.  See id. at 32. 
 206. Sam Bishop, Army Won’t Renew Alaska Native Firms’ Military Security 
Contracts, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER, Apr. 21, 2006. 
 207. Id. 
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Finally, strong dependence on sole-sourced government 
contracts may ultimately pit the ANCs against each other.  These 
preferences may invoke a race to capture the most lucrative sole-
source contracts, with intense lobbying between ANCs to be 
nominated for them.  The potential for this race was perhaps 
foreshadowed by what one commentator called a “scramble for 
money and power” in which villages and regions were “pitted 
against one another” by ANCSA provisions that required regional 
corporations to share natural resource profits with each other.208 
B. Costs and Benefits 
1. Impact on Alaska Natives: Increased Jobs and Dividends.  
The ANC edge has undeniably created jobs and sent dividend 
checks to Alaska Natives.209  Statistics bear out the conclusion that 
at least some of the dollar power of these contracting successes has 
flowed back to Alaska Natives in the state.  In 2003, for instance, 
the thirteen regional corporations and the twenty-eight village 
corporations collectively owned assets of $2.8 billion; made 
revenues of $2.9 billion; employed 10,541 workers within Alaska, 
2685 of whom were Alaska Natives; paid $78 million to 
shareholders as dividends; contributed $7 million of charitable 
donations; and gave $4.2 million worth of scholarships to over 2000 
students.210  In 2004, fifteen ANCs with 8(a) contracts distributed 
$27.14 million in dividends; donated $5.39 million to cultural 
programs; and paid $141 million to 7700 employees within the 
state, out of 27,800 nation-wide employees.211  Moreover, there 
have been media reports of success stories involving benefits 
derived from ANC profits within Alaska.212  Countering the strong 
media scrutiny of Alutiiq in its partnership with Wackenhut, for 
instance, is a lengthy article on the uses of Alutiiq profits, “[m]uch 
of” which “have gone back to the tribe.”213  From a half-million 
dollar loss in 2001, Alutiiq’s net income exceeded $20 million in 
2004, the year in which it received the defense contract when 
 
 208. Summit, supra note 5, at 617. 
 209. See Margaret Bauman, Report on Native Corporations Show in Revenue 
Growth, ALASKA J. OF COM., Nov. 20, 2005, available at http://www.alaska 
journal.com/stories/112005/loc_20051120031.shtml. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Press Release, Association of ANCSA Regional Corporation 
Presidents/CEOs, Alaska Native Corporations Annual Economic Report (July 18, 
2005) (available at http://www.chugach-ak.com/pdf/7136ANCSA2005report.pdf). 
 212. See, e.g., Connolly, supra note 106, at A1. 
 213. Id. 
05__YANG.DOC 1/10/2007  8:49 AM 
2006] ANC CONTRACTING PREFERENCES 345 
partnered with Wackenhut, $8.8 million of which was distributed in 
dividends to its 650 tribe member shareholders.214  This translated 
to $17,100 for the average shareholder, “enough to buy a car or 
make a down payment on a house.”215  Profits also go towards 
teaching young tribe members about the nearly extinct Alutiiq 
tribe, as well as cultural programs, scholarships that help young 
tribe members learn about their heritage, and even archeological 
projects supporting heritage museums.216 
Moreover, the ANC edge is in a unique position to provide 
jobs for Alaska Natives residing within Alaska.  For instance, most 
ANCs provide hiring preferences to Alaska Natives, cast in the 
form of preferences for Native Americans, Alaska Natives, 
shareholders, or close relatives of shareholders.217  These 
preferences benefit Alaska Natives in two important ways: First, 
ANC hiring may prove critical to the employment future of a 
young Alaska Native population, which will face a growing need 
for jobs in the near future.218  Second, Alaska Natives practice, and 
are highly dependent on, a mixed economy which combines 
“subsistence economies,” including activities such as fishing, 
hunting, and trapping, with modern jobs in construction.219  
Participation in a subsistence economy requires adherence to a 
traditional lifestyle which makes workers less available for modern 
jobs during the hunting and fishing seasons.220  This puts Alaska 
Natives at a disadvantage relative to incoming non-Natives who do 
not tend to adhere to such lifestyles when they are competing for 
jobs with non-Native employers who cannot or do not structure job 
opportunities “to accommodate this dependence on subsistence.”221  
ANCs, on the other hand, “are uniquely able to structure jobs in a 
 
 214. Id. 
 215. Paula Dobbyn, Some Say No-bid, No-limit Government Commissions for 
Natives are Unfair, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 19, 2006. 
 216. See Connolly, supra note 106, at A1. 
 217. James P. Mills, The Use of Hiring Preferences by Alaska Native 
Corporations After Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 403, 
404 (2005). 
 218. In 2000, over forty percent of Alaska Natives were below the age of 
majority, eighteen.  Id. 
 219. Lee Huskey, Alaska’s Village Economies, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 435, 447–48 (2004) (arguing that subsistence activities are important to 
the “future of village economies” and “should not be thought of as the economy 
of last resort”); see also Mills, supra note 217, at 408. 
 220. See Mills, supra note 217, at 408. 
 221. Id.; see also Huskey, supra note 219, at 457 (observing that village 
residents “may choose only limited participation in the labor force because wage 
work conflicts with subsistence activities”). 
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manner that is compatible with the subsistence needs of their 
shareholders and other village residents,” because their corporate 
leaders, drawn from the Native population, “are keenly aware of 
the needs of the shareholders in their regions and often participate 
in the subsistence activities themselves.”222 
A second reason that ANCs might be in a unique position to 
benefit Alaska Natives is related to what at least one economic 
expert has deemed a limited potential for the efficient economic 
development of natural resources within rural Alaska.223  This is 
due to the principle that the development of local resources can be 
“economically feasible only if resources can be produced and 
delivered to market at cost or below the current market price.”224  
The total cost of the resources brought to market will be increased 
by the “small size and remoteness of the villages,” which leads to 
lower economies of scale in production, dependence on imports, 
and raised transportation costs.225  Moreover, high costs of capital, 
due to “increased risk and transaction costs associated with doing 
business in small, remote places,” make investment projects from 
outside unlikely to earn a competitive rate of return. 226  The lack of 
profitable investment opportunities within rural areas explains a 
limited capital flow from outside the state.  Thus, with limited 
potential for economic activities within the state to improve the 
welfare of rural Alaska, the ANCs’ contracting activities on the 
national and international levels may indeed be the best or most 
efficient route to achieving that improvement.227 
2. But Not Enough Jobs and Dividends.  The common view 
among media commentators, however, seems to be that the ANC 
edge has not trickled as much benefit down to Alaska Natives as it 
should have.228  One specific charge is that ANCs do not hire 
enough Alaska Natives.229  For instance, in 2004, only thirty-three 
of Chenega Corp. and its subsidiaries’ 2300 employees were 
“Native Alaskans.”230  Moreover, a key criticism of ANCs’ practice 
 
 222. Mills, supra note 217, at 409–10. 
 223. See Huskey, supra note 219, at 456–60. 
 224. Id. at 458–59. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 459. 
 227. See id. 
 228. Scherer, supra note 4, at 26–28 (citing the opinion of a government 
contracts expert that the ANC edge has produced profits for exploiting companies 
rather than jobs for Alaska Natives). 
 229. See O’Harrow, supra note 137, at A04. 
 230. Id. 
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of subcontracting to non-Native corporations for performance of 
the sole-sourced contracts they receive is that, partly as a result of 
these subcontracts, few or no Alaska Natives are actually employed 
for the work.231  The SBA’s regulations do not require that Alaska 
Natives perform the work under a contract to an ANC, and they 
impose arguably weak limitations on subcontracting by requiring 
that certain percentages of the work under an 8(a) contract be 
performed by the 8(a) contractor in order “[t]o assist the business 
development of” 8(a) businesses.232  Specifically, an 8(a) business 
receiving a contract under the Program must perform at least fifty 
percent of the labor cost of a service contract with its own 
employees.233  Thus, an ANC would be in compliance with these 
regulations as long as its subcontractor performs no more than 
forty-nine percent of the work under a contract.234  For instance, in 
the Alutiiq/Wackenhut partnership to perform the Army contract 
for security guard services, the two firms jointly recruited security 
guards to fulfill the manpower required by the contract, and in 
their subcontracting agreement they designated fifty-one percent as 
Alutiiq employees and forty-nine percent as Wackenhut 
employees.235  Therefore, though on paper the employment 
arrangement complies with the requirement that the ANC provide 
at least fifty percent of the personnel in the contract,236 no Alaska 
Native need actually be hired.  In fact, Alutiiq itself admitted they 
only hired one Alaska Native guard.237  Similarly, Olgoonik Corp. 
has subcontracted to Halliburton a portion of military construction 
contracts worth over $225 million, such that much of the work is 
being performed not by Wainwright natives but by Halliburton.238  
Critics observe that the contracts are being performed on a 
national and international level rather than in the communities of 
the ANCs and that “the only impact on Wainwright has been some 
funds to remodel the town’s hotel and store.”239  These 
 
 231. Scherer, supra note 4, at 28. 
 232. 13 C.F.R. § 124.510(a) (2006). 
 233. Other limitations include at least fifty percent of the manufacturing costs 
of a contract to provide supplies or products, at least fifteen percent of the cost of 
a contract for general construction with its own employees, and at least twenty-
five percent of the cost of a construction contract by special trade contractors.  13 
C.F.R. § 125.6(a) (2006). 
 234. See id. 
 235. Miller, supra note 45, ¶ 29. 
 236. See 13 C.F.R. § 125.6(h). 
 237. See Miller, supra note 45, ¶ 30. 
 238. Scherer, supra note 4, at 26. 
 239. Id. 
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subcontracting practices have prompted one expert on federal 
procurements to proclaim that he sees “little evidence that this 
produces jobs in Alaska as opposed to profits for those 
entrepreneurs skillful enough to exploit it.”240 
3. Padding the Taxpayer Bill.  Another concern with sole-
source awards is that, due to the lack of competitive bidding, the 
final contract price is higher than it otherwise would be; thus 
“without competition it’s hard to ensure that taxpayers are getting 
their money’s worth.”241  A government procurement expert has 
made an observation that strongly supports this argument, pointing 
out that in many cases where the work is subcontracted out to non-
8(a) firms, the ANC is otherwise unable to perform the contract 
alone.242  Sole-sourcing such contracts to partnerships like 
Alutiiq/Wackenhut inflates the contract price from the price that 
might be obtained if either Alutiiq or Wackenhut were to win the 
contract through competitive bidding on its own “by adding a layer 
of overhead.”243  Thus, these sole-source awards result in not only 
reduced competition but also inflated prices, translating into higher 
costs to taxpayers.  The vice president of policy for Taxpayers for 
Common Sense, for instance, has called ANCs’ advantages “a 
horrible deal for taxpayers.”244 
These charges have largely been borne out by the results of a 
government inquiry in 2006.  The GAO’s investigation into the 
Army’s reliance on ANCs in its security guard contract program 
pointed out that, in a “three-phased approach” to acquisition, the 
Army contracted with ANCs in an initial phase, used four 
competitive contracts in a second phase, and in the final phase 
inexplicably reverted to the ANCs used in the first phase for 
additional work despite knowledge that the cost per employee of 
the competitive contracts was twenty-five percent lower than the 
ANC contracts.245  The latest development in this charge of 
“wasteful spending” has taken place in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina when Representative Waxman wrote to the GAO again.246 
 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Patience Wait, Tribal Companies’ Edge Stirring a Backlash? 24, no. 2 
GOV’T COMPUTER NEWS 12, Jan. 24, 2005. 
 243. Id. 
 244. O’Harrow & Higham, supra note 30, at A1 (internal quotations omitted). 
 245. GAO GUARD PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 145, at 10, 14. 
 246. Letter from Henry Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, House Comm. 
on Gov’t Reform, to David M. Walker, U.S. Comptroller Gen. (Sept. 13, 2005), 
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He warned that the history of no-bid contracts, especially in Iraq, 
has led to “[w]aste, fraud, and abuse” that “appear to have 
squandered hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars,” and that the 
same appears likely to continue in “contracts for recovery and 
rebuilding of the devastated Gulf Coast” since the first round of 
contracts had been issued without competition.247  He urged the 
GAO to establish an audit to monitor contract spending for 
reconstruction.248  His concerns were confirmed by the GAO report 
in 2006.249 
4. Excluding Other Small Businesses and 8(a) Businesses.  
Other 8(a) businesses that are not owned by ANCs or Indian tribes 
also allegedly suffer from the advantages granted exclusively to 
ANCs and tribally-owned firms. They are excluded from contracts 
they otherwise might have secured through competition as well as 
subjected to the dollar limitations on the amount of awards they 
can be sole-sourced.250  For instance, an African-American or 
Asian-American-owned business could not be sole-sourced the 
$500 million contract that was awarded to Chenega without 
competition.  This creates an exclusionary effect on the access of 
non-tribally owned 8(a) businesses to contracts of such size.251  This 
disadvantage seems to be borne out by statistics.  For instance, in 
2003, eight tribally owned businesses, including seven ANC 
subsidiaries, made the list of Washington Technology’s Top 25 8(a) 
businesses in terms of primary contracting dollars in the 
information technology sector.252  Tribally owned businesses made 
the top four of the top twenty-five, and that top four included three 
subsidiaries of ANCs.253  A Chenega subsidiary came in at number 
one primarily due to its $500 million, ten-year contract awarded by 
the Department of Homeland Security to provide maintenance and 
technical support for customs inspection equipment.254  Moreover, 
 
available at http://housedemocrats.gov/news/librarydetail.cfm?library_content_ 
id=504. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HURRICANE KATRINA: ARMY 
CORPS OF ENGINEERS CONTRACT FOR MISSISSIPPI CLASSROOMS 1–2 (2006). 
 250. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.506 (2006). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Patience Wait, Tribal Companies Dominate Top 25 8(a)s, WASH. TECH., 
Sept. 13, 2004, available at http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/19_12/ 
special-report/24486-1.html. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
05__YANG.DOC 1/10/2007  8:49 AM 
350 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [23:315 
in 2002, ANCs constituted less than two percent of all small 
businesses, but twelve percent of government contracts awarded to 
small businesses were awarded to them.255 
These criticisms from the non-Alaska Native minority small 
business communities have become even more charged after the 
release of the GAO report on ANC participation in the 8(a) 
Program this year.  Harry Alford, president of the National Black 
Chamber of Commerce, stated bluntly that the “ANC ‘game’” is “a 
tool for avaristic manipulators” that is “reeking [sic] havoc on 8(a) 
firms and the African American, Hispanic, Asian and, yes, the 
Native American communities” and that ANCs “have become 
predators on the minority business community.”256  Alford 
concluded by suggesting that ANCs be “separate[d]” from the 8(a) 
program.257 
Leaders of the Indian community have responded with 
charges of “business jealous[y],” characterizing such complaints as 
an unfortunate backlash against the marginal success of American 
Indians’ “catching up” with the rest of the minority community.258  
However, the force behind the exclusion argument is gathering 
rapidly.  Alford has been a strong voice behind this line of 
reasoning, arguing that ANCs’ “disproportionate share of” 8(a) 
contracts has adversely affected the Black business community, 
pointing to specific instances of what he considers “abusive” 
contracting in which ANCs act as “fronts for large non-Native 
contractors” rather than subcontracting to other minority 
businesses.259  Alford’s latest example illustrating these alleged 
problems was the awarding of a contract to an ANC to provide 
portable classrooms in Mississippi at a price of thirty-nine million 
dollars, even when a local African American business was available 
to do the work at a quoted price of twenty-five million dollars and 
had decades of previous experience doing the exact same work.260  
Similar grievances have come from Steve Denlinger, President of 
the Latin American Management Association, who relayed the 
 
 255. See Miller, supra note 26, at A1. 
 256. Alford Statement, supra note 177, at 3. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Pete Homer, Congressional Probe of Alaska Native Corporations an 
Attack on Indian Country’s Economic Future, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Mar. 19, 
2005, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096410593. 
 259. See Nat’l Indian Bus. Ass’n, supra note 177. 
 260. Experiences and Challenges of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees, Before the H. 
Select Comm. on Katrina Response Investigation (Dec. 6, 2005) (statement of 
Harry C. Alford, President/CEO, The National Black Chamber of Commerce, 
Inc.). 
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complaint of five employees of an 8(a) company.261  They 
complained that Chugach Alaska Corp., after being sole-sourced a 
one hundred million dollar contract for work within New Mexico, 
subcontracted out of state rather than to their New Mexico 
business which had previously performed that contract and had 
expected to be subcontracted by Chugach.262  The Women 
Impacting Public Policy group has likewise spoken out, stating that 
its members have “lost opportunities to ANCs” due to the ANC 
edge in the 8(a) Program.263 
Arguments in support of special treatment for ANCs primarily 
cite two ways in which these corporations are different than other 
small and disadvantaged 8(a) businesses.  First, the contracting 
preferences accorded to ANCs under the 8(a) Program derive from 
a political relationship with the federal government unique to 
Native Americans.264  Proponents of this argument frame the issue 
as “warring tensions between competing, and arguably 
irreconcilable, clusters of public policy issues,” seeing the 
procurement policy of competition pitted against “federal Indian 
policy,” including Congress’ obligations to Alaska Natives under 
ANCSA.265  Under this line of reasoning, the federal government’s 
policy on Indians, including the 8(a) ANC edge, is “rooted in the 
extraordinary government-to-government relationship of the 
Federal Government and Indian tribes,”266 which is expressed in the 
Indian Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution267 and 
other laws.268  The ANC edge is thus justified even if it grants 
 
 261. See Nat’l Indian Bus. Ass’n., supra note 177. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Northern Lights and Procurement Plights: The Effect of the ANC Program 
on Federal Procurement and Alaska Native Corporations, Before the H. Comm. on 
Government Reform and the H. Comm. on Small Business, 109th Cong. (2006) 
(statement of Ann Sullivan on behalf of Women Impacting Public Policy), 
available at http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/WIPP%20-%20Sullivan%20 
Testimony.pdf. 
 264. See Northern Lights and Procurement Plights: The Effect of the ANC 
Program on Federal Procurement and Alaska Native Corporations Before the H. 
Comm. on Government Reform and the H. Comm. on Small Business, 109th Cong. 
(2006) (statement of Chris McNeil, Jr., Chairman, Native American Contractors 
Association), available at http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/NACA%20-
%20McNeil%20Testimony.pdf. [hereinafter McNeil Statement]. 
 265. William K. Walker, Feature Comment: Alaska Native Participation in 
Government Contracts: Victims of Success, 47, no. 28 GOV’T CONTRACTOR 1, 1 
(2005). 
 266. Id. at 4. 
 267. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. 
 268. See Walker, supra note 265, at 4–7. 
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preferences over and above those given to other small minority 
businesses because Native Americans “have a lexical first priority 
in the distribution of Government benefits.”269 
Second, ANCs are responsible for benefiting entire 
communities of Alaska Native shareholders, while other minority 
businesses are geared for individual success.270  Supporters use this 
argument to re-characterize the GAO’s data regarding ANCs’ 
participation in 8(a) contracting as “[a] [s]liver of the [p]ie,” noting 
that the thirteen percent of all 8(a) contract dollars in 2004 were 
awarded to ANCs that “represent 100,000 Alaska Native 
shareholders,” while the other eighty-seven percent were doled out 
“to roughly 9000 individually owned 8(a) companies”—a powerful 
contrast designed to highlight the greater need of ANCs.271  
Additionally, supporters point out that ANCs, because they incur 
high administrative costs that are unusual for business entities, such 
as the costs of selecting land and operating a department to 
administer land, are “structurally noncompetitive and inherent 
money-losers.”272  Thus, if they have an edge in the 8(a) Program, it 
is in part to compensate them for these additional burdens. 
C. Solutions and Alternatives 
To sum up the discussion thus far, since the ANC edge has the 
potential to return dividend income to Alaska Native shareholders 
as well as to create jobs and promote other development for 
Alaska Natives, a blunt approach such as removal of ANCs from 
the program appears unwise.273  On the other hand, a major 
criticism of ANCs’ use of their edge is that such dividends, jobs, 
and other benefits simply are insufficient in magnitude.274  
Additionally, many worry about excessive circumvention of the 
competition policy underlying the Act and the 8(a) Program arising 
 
 269. Id. 
 270. See Northern Lights and Procurement Plight:, The Effect of the ANC 
Program on Federal Procurement and Alaska Native Corporations Before the H. 
Comm. on Government Reform and the H. Comm. on Small Business, 109th Cong. 
(2006) (statement of Helvi Sandvik, President, NANA Development 
Corporation), available at http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/NANA%20-
%20Sandvik%20Testimony.pdf [hereinafter Sandvik Statement] (pointing out 
that NANA Development Corporation provides benefits to its 11,200 
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individually owned 8(a) company and an ANC-owned 8(a) company”). 
 271. McNeil Statement, supra note 264. 
 272. Walker, supra note 265, at 6. 
 273. See supra Part VI.B.1. 
 274. See supra Part VI.B.2. 
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from the unique advantages available to ANCs.275  Other 
complaints include negative impacts on the taxpayer dollar, other 
small and 8(a) businesses, and even the ANCs and Alaska Natives 
themselves.276 
1. Some Possibilities and Dilemmas.  One clear need above 
all emerges from this overview: to strike a balance between 
discontinuing these advantages simply because of negative 
sentiment toward the enormous success of unlikely parties and 
allowing these advantages to be exploited to the point where the 
rich (and non-disadvantaged) companies get richer at the expense 
of minority small businesses, overcharged taxpayers, and 
increasingly dependent ANCs.  Ideal solutions would allow the 
benefit of potential for job and dividend generation to continue 
and grow while adopting measures that target the costs in a focused 
way. 
a. GAO Proposed Solutions.  Though the 2006 GAO reports 
provided some answers,277 the investigations primarily created two 
additional phenomena, neither of which is particularly conducive to 
the task of finding a lasting solution to the real problems associated 
with the ANC edge.  First, the investigations inspired rounds of 
finger-pointing and blame-shifting between the different entities 
responsible for oversight of contracts performed by 8(a) businesses.  
For instance, the GAO’s report on ANC participation in Army 
security guard contracts indicated the Army contracting official did 
not adequately ensure that the ANCs are complying with the limits 
on subcontracting.278  In response, the official simply “pointed to  
[the] SBA.”279  The SBA, in turn, passed the blame to institutional 
defects, and in effect Congress, contending that the “issues 
addressed in the report come from activities that are part of the 
program as Congress designed it.”280 
 
 275. See supra Part VI.A.1. 
 276. See supra Parts VI.A.2, VI.B.3–4. 
 277. See supra Part V. 
 278. GAO GUARD PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 145, at 15. 
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 280. Northern Lights and Procurement Plight: The Effect of the ANC Program 
on Federal Procurement and Alaska Native Corporations Before the H. Comm. on 
Government Reform and the H. Comm. on Small Business, 109th Cong. (2006) 
(statement of Calvin Jenkins, Deputy Associate Deputy Administrator, Office of 
Government Contracting and Business Development, U.S. Small Business 
Administration), available at http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/SBA%20-
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Second, the reports have set off a battle of anecdotes and a 
war of statistics.  To put the GAO report’s data on the ANC share 
of 8(a) contracting “in perspective,” the president of NANA 
Development Corporation cited another study showing that Alaska 
Native companies were awarded only 0.2 percent of all federal 
contracts from 1998 to 2003 and only 6.22 percent of all 8(a) 
contracts from 2001 to 2003.281  More specifically, the toll of the 
ANC edge on taxpayers is muddled rather than brought to light by 
the GAO’s report.  The GAO reported that government agencies 
contract with—in particular, sole-source to—ANCs in order to 
“quickly, easily, and legally award contracts for any value” while 
meeting not only its small business goals but also its small, 
disadvantaged business goals, taking “credit in more than one small 
business category.”282  Several examples were then cited in which 
agencies contracted on a sole-source basis to ANCs especially 
when under-staffed because such contracts consumed less 
administrative resources and time.283  This may suggest that 
contracting with ANCs translates into lower administrative costs in 
government procurement.  Yet, at the same time, the report also 
offered a counter example to these administrative savings, where 
an agency went to great lengths to accept ANC contracts even 
when the proposal price was unsatisfactory, resulting in both a 
higher cost of the ultimate contract as well as resources consumed 
in extensive negotiations over price.284 
Is the net result a wash?  The president of NANA 
Development Corporation argued in response to the GAO report 
that time and money are spent “up front” in an 8(a) contract to an 
ANC in negotiations, “rather than analyzing multiple proposals 
and references after contract terms, conditions, and requirements 
[are] published” as in a normal contract and that, as a result, the 
negotiation process in awarding an 8(a) contract “ensures the best 
value for the government.”285  However, whether the costs of 
negotiation are always lower than the costs of analyzing multiple 
proposals in unclear. 
Also, the GAO report could not confirm or deny the existence 
of “an explicit link between the revenues generated from the 8(a) 
Program and benefits provided to shareholders,” except to say that 
 
 281. Sandvik Statement, supra note 270. 
 282. GAO 8(A) REPORT, supra note 146, at 16, 19. 
 283. Id. at 16–18. 
 284. See id. at 17 (citing an example wherein the State Department “negotiated 
extensively for over a month” with an ANC only to accept a final price that “was 
still slightly over the government’s estimate”). 
 285. Sandvik Statement, supra note 270. 
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benefits—including dividends, scholarships, and cultural 
programs—do exist, but that a high level of 8(a) revenues do not 
necessarily guarantee a high level of shareholder benefit.286  For this 
conclusion, the report cited three examples: one example in which 
a corporation with high 8(a) revenues provided a high level of 
benefits, a second example in which a corporation with high 8(a) 
activity provided a low level of benefits, and a third example in 
which an ANC with low 8(a) participation still provided a high 
level of benefits.287  Indeed, the president of NANA Development 
Corporation cited his corporation as an example of an ANC that 
pays almost all of its profits out as dividends.288 
Finally, most of the results of the legislative investigations are 
subject to multiple interpretations.  For one, critics of the GAO 
findings argue that the reports treat ANCs unfairly by attributing 
to ANCs problems that are universal to federal procurement.289  
Thus, defenders argue that ANCs have been made “a convenient 
scapegoat” for “well-documented systemic problems with the 
procurement system.”290  Also using this strategy, the SBA was 
quick to point out that federal dollars devoted to other small 
disadvantaged businesses, such as women-owned businesses, 
disabled veterans’ businesses, and small businesses in general had 
also increased significantly during the same period of time.291  
Moreover, supporters of ANCs emphasize that the report “is 
remarkable for what it does not contain,”292 noting that it “did not 
cite any waste, fraud, or abuse on the part of ANCs,” but rather 
focused on the inadequacy of the SBA and contracting officials 
rather than the contractors.293  Others hasten to add their 
interpretation that the report did not “call for legislative changes” 
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 287. Id. at 24–25. 
 288. Sandvik Statement, supra note 270. 
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(statements of Helvi Sandvik, President, NANA Development Corporation; Julie 
Kitka, President, Alaska Federation of Natives; Charles Totemoff, Chief 
Executive Officer, Chenega Corporation), available at http://reform.house.gov/ 
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to the 8(a) Program.294  To this, the critics respond that “nowhere in 
the GAO report is there a statement that the contracts were 
awarded to ANCs because of the quality or value of the 
performance offered.”295  The SBA, meanwhile, offers its own 
interpretation that “there is no indication within this report of 
wrongdoing by any participant in the program” and that it actually 
represents a criticism of flaws in the 8(a) Program “as Congress 
designed it.”296 
The recommendations proposed by the GAO’s reports in 2006 
focused primarily on oversight by the SBA and compliance with 
the regulations by contracting agencies.297  These measures should 
be taken because enforcement of the regulations already in place 
would help ensure that the ANC edge in practice conforms to its 
legal parameters.  However, conformity with the legal parameters 
of the 8(a) Program does not seem to be the heart of the problem, 
and increased oversight and compliance may not be enough if the 
problems which have inspired the bulk of criticism are not that the 
laws are being violated or even circumvented.  As many have 
pointed out, the GAO reports did not cite or even suggest outright 
fraud by ANCs or other contractors.298  Rather, the implication of 
the findings is that the spirit of the laws is being violated by 
practices which are perfectly legal but either lie at the outer edges 
of legality of the preferences or take advantage of loopholes in the 
laws.  For example, the ANC practice of owning multiple 
subsidiaries that also participate in the 8(a) Program and creating 
new subsidiaries to lengthen the life of existing subsidiaries’ 8(a) 
contracts when they expire is fully legitimate under the regulations 
but runs counter to the spirit of the 8(a) regulatory framework.299  
Thus, strengthening oversight and compliance may not be the 
complete answer; rather, the design of the system is due for an 
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overhaul.  Some possible solutions and their ability to do this are 
explored in the rest of this discussion. 
b. Other Possible Solutions.  One solution that would 
seemingly silence all complaints against the ANC edge is to limit it.  
Short of the drastic measure of taking ANCs out of the program 
altogether,300 one method might be to discontinue sole-sourcing of 
federal contracts for ANCs.  This, however, may effectively take 
ANCs out of the 8(a) Program.  While it would certainly alleviate 
practically all of the above concerns regarding the ANC edge, it 
raises serious fairness concerns if other minority 8(a) firms 
continue to be sole-sourced contracts.  Moreover, because the link 
between sole-source 8(a) revenue and benefits to Alaska Native 
shareholders has not conclusively been established or disproved,301 
removing the sole-source advantages may be unduly harsh. 
A more focused solution is perhaps to discontinue the practice 
of automatically qualifying ANCs as socially and economically 
disadvantaged for purposes of eligibility for the 8(a) Program.302  
This measure would not, however, cure any current abuses by 
ANCs that are already in the program and is only likely to keep out 
ANCs that have yet to enter the federal contracting arena and are, 
as a result, much less well-off.  Thus, it may be unsound as a matter 
of fairness. 
Another interesting solution that has been proposed is to 
create a special procurement program for “representative 
organizations,” businesses like ANCs that represent the economic 
interests of many minority individuals and communities rather than 
individual businesses.303  This alternative would indeed be best at 
addressing the unique economic needs of ANCs and other Native 
corporations, but depending on the features of such a program, it 
seems to have the potential to anger other small minority 
businesses even further because it would merely accentuate the 
uniqueness and the special preferential status of ANCs. 
Two solutions hold the most potential for addressing the ANC 
edge’s negative impact on competition, the taxpayer, and other 
8(a) businesses at once.  One is to remove the exemption of ANC 
and tribally-owned businesses from the dollar limitation threshold 
on sole-source awards.304  This would certainly mitigate the extent 
 
 300. See Nat’l Indian Bus. Ass’n., supra note 177. 
 301. GAO 8(A) REPORT, supra note 146, at 24. 
 302. See 43 U.S.C. § 1626(e)(1) (2000); 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(a)(2), (4) (2006). 
 303. Walker, supra note 265, at 7. 
 304. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.506 (detailing at what dollar threshold an 8(a) 
procurement must be competed among eligible participants). 
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to which ANCs can circumvent the competitive process for 
receiving government contract awards, as well as reduce stress on 
the taxpayer and put ANCs on a level playing field with other 8(a) 
businesses.  The SBA’s proposed changes to the 8(a) Program in 
April 2006, on the heels of the GAO report, provide solutions of 
this nature, by first removing the exemption for joint ventures 
between ANCs/tribally-owned businesses and non-8(a) entities and 
then by enabling NHOs to receive contracts above the competitive 
threshold, but only with the Department of Defense.305 
These are steps in the right direction, but they may not fully 
alleviate the problems associated with the absence of dollar 
limitations on sole-source contracts.  For one, removing the 
exemption for an ANC/non-ANC joint venture does not, in theory, 
prevent the same large contract from being awarded to one of the 
ANC’s subsidiaries and then subcontracted up to forty-nine 
percent to that same joint venturer.  This highlights what is likely a 
recurring dilemma in the search for effective regulatory solutions: 
that any changes to the system may well create more loopholes 
while closing existing ones, especially given that at least some 
ANCs have become sophisticated business entities with the full 
range of corporate reorganization maneuvers at their disposal, a 
phenomenon highlighted in the GAO’s report. 
The other solution is to directly limit the sole-sourced awards 
to corporations by requiring an ANC receiving a sole-sourced 
contract to: (1) subcontract the work to other minority or 8(a) 
businesses;306 (2) perform the entire work; or (3) perform a 
percentage of the work much higher than fifty percent.  The second 
and third route are plagued with the possibility that ANCs’ access 
to federal contracts may be drastically reduced as a side effect 
because their much-publicized inexperience with respect to some 
of the military and defense contracts they have received might 
make it either impossible or enormously costly for them to receive 
such contracts.307  The first option, a requirement to subcontract to 
other minority or 8(a) firms, seems to be the most sensible in that it 
not only prevents non-disadvantaged firms like Wackenhut from 
exploiting the subcontracting loophole, but it also increases 
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minority participation in and access to federal contracts, alleviating 
the exclusion of other 8(a) businesses from the procurement pie.308 
However, a key policy dilemma is raised by the two favored 
solutions: while they may succeed in mitigating the ANC edge, they 
may, at the same time, devastate the ANCs that are now dependent 
on government contracts for survival.309  These two modifications of 
the ANC edge may seem justified in part because there is a serious 
question of whether certain ANCs, those that have seen the most 
contracting successes, are still “economically disadvantaged” in 
light of those successes.310  For instance, in June 2005 the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) discontinued its practice, dating back to the 
passage of ANCSA in 1971, of exempting ANC shareholder 
dividends from federal tax levies on property, in part because ANC 
dividends, at least for some ANCs, “have increased substantially 
over the years,” “indicating there’s money to be captured.”311 
The argument that ANC contracting advantages should be 
discontinued on the grounds that certain ANCs have become so 
successful that they no longer need such assistance is subject to a 
paradox of sorts, in that practically the only reason that certain 
ANCs have become so successful has been their privileged access 
to enormous government contracts with no dollar limitation.  To 
illustrate, statistics indicate that the vast majority of federal 
contracts awarded to ANCs and other tribally-owned businesses 
between 1999 and 2003 were sole-sourced.312  This means that if the 
ANC edge is removed, a real question remains as to whether 
ANCs would not experience just as quick and drastic a flight into 
the state of near-bankruptcy as some of them endured before 
taking advantage of government contracts.313 
The downward flight might happen in several ways.  For one, 
subjecting ANCs to the same dollar limitation as other minority 
small businesses may conceivably lead to a dramatic reduction in 
the benefit being trickled down to Alaska Native shareholders.314  
For instance, Michael Brown’s justification for the exemption from 
sole-source dollar limitation for ANCs was that ANCs have greater 
needs than the usual small business; in his words, “if it’s a guy and 
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his wife, then a $3- million project can provide significant economic 
benefit . . . [b]ut if you’re dealing with a tribe with several million 
people, you’ve got to have larger contracts.”315  Some 2003 statistics 
show that there is a real trickle-down phenomenon: $78 million of 
the $2.8 billion in revenues—slightly below one third of one 
percent—was translated into shareholder profits.316  Imposing three 
million and five million dollar limits on the value of contracts 
ANCs may be sole-sourced may mean that each native shareholder 
would see dramatically leaner checks.317 
That potential reduction in welfare might not be as drastic if 
ANCs were able to replace one $500 million contract with either 
hundreds of sole-source contracts under the dollar limitation or a 
single $500 million contract won through the competitive bidding 
process.  The ability of ANCs to competitively win such enormous 
awards, however, is uncertain because their receipts of multimillion 
dollar sole-source contracts based on the ANC edge indicate 
nothing about their capability to perform the work at the lowest 
cost when compared to multiple bidders, and the laws that have 
enabled them to receive such sole-source awards thus far do not 
encourage or develop that ability.318  Even relatively modest 
cutbacks to the system that produces the ANC edge, such as higher 
restrictions on subcontracting, could translate to dramatic 
reductions in ANC success.  For instance, the GAO report on the 
Army’s reliance on ANC firms for its security guard contracts 
stated that before the sole-source contracts were awarded, the 
Defense Contract Management Agency had rated one of the two 
ANCs as “high risk” in performance due to inexperience in service 
provision.319  However, the contract was awarded because this “risk 
was mitigated somewhat” due to the firm’s choice to “team up with 
a subcontractor experienced in providing security guard 
services.”320 
As a matter of fact, the legal advantages that allow ANCs to 
receive contracts of such enormous proportion without going 
through the competitive process merely cultivate a dependency on 
those advantages.321  This all means that the inquiry of whether the 
ANC edge ought to be discontinued runs into a dilemma: the legal 
advantages have fostered not an independent ability to compete in 
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the marketplace but a dependence on that assistance without which 
it is doubtful that ANCs could continue their current success.322  
Thus, it is difficult to take away these advantages without 
substantially hurting their intended beneficiaries. 
2. Caveats and Alternatives to Legislative Reform.  One 
caveat is the possibility that modifying the ANC edge may open the 
door to other reforms which are undesirable at this stage of Native 
Americans’ and Alaska Natives’ economic development.323  
Leaders of the Native American community have spoken out 
against any drastic changes to the 8(a) Program’s advantages for 
businesses owned by Indian Tribes and ANCs, warning that, while 
negative congressional and media attention has been focused on 
ANCs, reforms based on such attention may harm tribal federal 
contracting in the rest of the country as well as open the door to 
erosion of tribal gaming and other rights and programs for all 
Native Americans.324 
Moreover, before any enactment of concrete measures, ANCs 
should be given more time to prove that advantages from their 
contract awards truly do benefit Alaska Natives who would 
otherwise be impoverished.  For instance, Neal Fried, Alaska’s 
Department of Labor economist, offered his opinion that ANCs 
“are just starting to make an impact on the tribes,” suggesting that 
given more time, their contracting activities may lead to more 
pronounced improvement in the welfare of Alaska Natives.325  This 
is especially true in light of the fact that some ANCs are only 
beginning to be successful in the 8(a) contracting arena.326 
Finally, there are some alternatives to substantive legislative 
reform for mitigating the ANC edge’s negative effects.  Procedural 
protection, for one, should be more fully explored.  For example, 
the law does contain a provision that presents possibilities for 
limiting the exclusionary effect of the ANC edge on small 
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businesses outside of the 8(a) Program,327 though as far as known 
by the author it has not been used.  Under the SBA’s own 
regulations, it may make a determination that accepting an 8(a) 
award would create “adverse impact on an individual small 
business, a group of small businesses located in a specific 
geographical location, or other small business programs,” in which 
case it will not accept the award under 8(a).328  The limitation is 
“designed to protect small business concerns which are performing 
Government contracts awarded outside the 8(a) BD program,” and 
in certain circumstances the adverse impact is presumed to exist, 
such as when a small business not under the 8(a) Program has been 
performing the contract in question for at least two years.329  Thus, 
if the contracts to ANCs continue to expand, the potential for that 
expansion to squeeze out other small businesses from the 
government procurement pie may be curbed by this adverse impact 
determination.  However, there are significant drawbacks to this 
tool.  It is unable to protect other 8(a) businesses, and contracts for 
construction, a large, important category of contracts, are 
considered “new requirements” and are immune from the adverse 
impact determinations.330 
Most importantly, measures that can be taken by ANCs 
themselves rather than legislators should be emphasized.  Some 
suggested strategies have focused on reforming both the structure 
and the federal contracting practices of ANCs so that they become 
more involved in developing skills to compete in the national and 
international markets independently, without special sole-source 
contracting advantages.331  For instance, it has been suggested that 
they should integrate boards of directors into daily management, 
train native shareholders to participate in running the companies, 
and set goals for winning competitive contracts.332  These measures 
would certainly reduce the dependency on sole-source awards 
fostered by the ANC edge.  Given time, ANCs may then become 
more able competitors, alleviating the concerns with regard to 
competition policy, taxpayer bills, and exclusion of other 8(a) 
businesses. 
 
 327. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.504(c) (2006). 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. 13 C.F.R. § 124.504(c)(1)(B). 
 331. Nadler, supra note 195. 
 332. Id. 
05__YANG.DOC 1/10/2007  8:49 AM 
2006] ANC CONTRACTING PREFERENCES 363 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
In sum, while the ANC edge has undeniably led to jobs and 
dividends for Alaska Natives, it has also imposed costs on 
competition itself, taxpayers, other small and minority businesses, 
and ANCs themselves.  The most serious flaw in the unique legal 
preferences accorded to ANCs is not the creation of loopholes that 
allow large corporations like Wackenhut to access government 
contracts to which they would not otherwise have access.333  This 
problem, while serious and pervasive, can be alleviated in a direct 
and focused way through more rigorous legal limitations on 
subcontracting.334 
The more serious problem, it seems, lies in the potential of the 
ANC edge to foster a dependence by ANCs. This undermines the 
possibility of reforms that would control the ANC edge’s impact on 
taxpayers and other 8(a) businesses without significantly hurting 
Alaska Natives at the same time.335  Therefore, any reforms should 
primarily target reduction and prevention of a permanent reliance 
on the ANC edge.  Perhaps most importantly, ANCs should focus 
on developing other economic activities besides government 
contracting with the defense sector as a way to promote business 
development and the ability to compete effectively in the 
marketplace on a self-sufficient basis.  These abilities could reduce 
their reliance on the ANC edge and thus alleviate its negative 
impact on competition, taxpayers, and other 8(a) participants. 
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